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Abstract
Economic analysis is a highly influential theoretical approach to 
contract law. At the same time, feminist analysis of contract law 
offers an important critical approach to the field. However, fem-
inist economics, a prominent alternative approach to mainstream 
neo-classical economics drawing from both economic theory and 
feminist theory, has only been applied scarcely and sporadically to 
contract law. This Article seeks to bridge this gap and to apply 
the key features of feminist economics to an analysis of the doc-
trine of promissory estoppel. This Article uses promissory estoppel 
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Introduction
Economic analysis is a prominent theoretical approach to contract
law.1 At the same time, feminist analysis is an important critical ap-
proach to contract law.2 However, contract law scholars have paid only 
1. For economic analysis of contract law, see STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 291 (2004); RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS OF LAW 95 (9th ed. 2014); ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW &
ECONOMICS 276 (6th ed. 2012); Benjamin E. Hermalin, Avery W. Katz & Richard
Craswell, Contract Law, in HANDBOOK OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 7 (A. Mitchell Po-
linsky & Steven Shvell eds., 2007).
2. Hila Keren, Feminism and Contract Law, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON FEMINIST
JURISPRUDENCE 406 (Robin West & Cynthia Grant Bowman eds., 2019); Debora L.
Threedy, Dancing Around Gender: Lessons from Arthur Murray on Gender and Con-
tracts, 45 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 749 (2010) [hereinafter Threedy, Dancing Around
Gender]; Debora L. Threedy, Feminists and Contract Doctrine, 32 IND. L. REV. 1247
(1999); MARY JOE FRUG, POSTMODERN LEGAL FEMINISM (1992); Patricia A. Tidwell
& Peter Linzer, The Flesh-Colored Band Aid: Contracts, Feminism, Dialogue, and
Norms, 28 HOUS. L. REV. 791 (1991); Lea S. VanderVelde, The Gendered Origins of
the Lumley Doctrine: Binding Men’s Consciences and Women’s Fidelity, 101 YALE L.J.
775 (1992); Amy J. Schmitz, Sex Matters: Considering Gender in Consumer Contract-
ing, 19 CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 437 (2013); FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES ON
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scarce attention to feminist economics.3 This Article aims to fill this 
void. The integration of both feminist theory and economics contrib-
utes to contract law analysis beyond the application of each theory 
alone. Economic analysis of contract law infused with feminist insights 
contributes to the development of contract law doctrines and core val-
ues.4
Using promissory estoppel as an example, this Article argues that 
feminist economic analysis enriches contract law. The theoretical in-
sights of feminist economics are applicable to promissory estoppel as 
well as to other doctrines such as unconscionability, good faith, inter-
pretation, duress, and undue influence, as well as to core concepts, val-
ues, and principles of contract law such as autonomy, consent, and free-
dom of contract.
The doctrine of promissory estoppel has captured much scholarly 
attention.5 Some scholars6 view promissory estoppel as an insignificant 
and limited doctrine, a doctrine that is a mere substitute for the doctrine 
of consideration or a secondary doctrine of contract formation that de-
viates from the basic principles of contract law. Other scholars7 view 
promissory estoppel as an important doctrine serving important func-
tions, such as: making contract formation broader and more flexible; 
mitigating power imbalance between parties; strengthening the right to 
CONTRACT LAW (Linda Mulcahy & Sally Wheeler eds., 2005); Martha M. Ertman,
Legal Tenderness: Feminist Perspectives on Contract Law, 18 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM
545 (2006) (book review); Mary Joe Frug, Re-Reading Contracts: A Feminist Analysis
of a Contracts Casebook, 34 AM. U. L. REV. 1065 (1985).
3. For contract law scholarship from feminist economic perspectives, see, for example,
Gillian K. Hadfield, The Dilemma of Choice: A Feminist Perspective on the Limits of
Freedom of Contract, 33 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 337 (1995); Alice Belcher, A Feminist
Perspective on Contract Theories from Law and Economics, 8 FEMINIST LEGAL STUD.
29 (2000); Adi Ayal, The Economic and Feminist Approaches to Law: An Eternal Feud
or a Misunderstanding Among Friends?, 10 DEMOCRATIC CULTURE 11 (2005).
4. “Feminist economics is a field that includes both studies of gender roles in the econ-
omy from a liberatory perspective and critical work directed at biases in the econom-
ics discipline.” Julie A. Nelson, Feminist Economics, in THE NEW PALGRAVE
DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS 4512, 4512 (3d ed. 2018). For a detailed explanation of
feminist economics see infra Part II.
5. Orit Gan, Promissory Estoppel: A Call for a More Inclusive Contract Law, 16 J.
GENDER RACE & JUST. 47, 52 (2013).                                                                                                   
6. See Jay M. Feinman, Promissory Estoppel and Judicial Method, 97 HARV. L. REV. 678,
680 (1984); Joseph D. Weinstein, Comment, Promissory Estoppel in Washington, 55
WASH. L. REV. 795, 796 (1980); Robert A. Hillman, Questioning the “New Consen-
sus” on Promissory Estoppel: An Empirical and Theoretical Study, 98 COLUM. L. REV.
580, 581 (1998).
7. See generally Charles L. Knapp, Rescuing Reliance: The Perils of Promissory Estoppel, 49
HASTINGS L.J. 1191 (1998).
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contract; and promoting values—such as trust, cooperation, fairness, 
and justice.
This Article joins the latter scholars, arguing for the significance of 
promissory estoppel from a feminist economic perspective. Specifically, 
this Article shows how feminist economic analysis enriches and expands 
classic economic analysis of promissory estoppel.8 According to feminist 
economics, promissory estoppel expands contract law beyond the bar-
gain theory,9 thus adding to the debate regarding the relation between 
the doctrine of consideration and the promissory estoppel doctrine.10 In 
other words, a feminist economic analysis demonstrates how promissory 
estoppel complements the doctrine of consideration.
Take, for example, Ricketts v. Scothorn.11 In this classic case, a 
grandfather promised his granddaughter that he would financially sup-
port her so that she would not have to work. On the basis of this prom-
ise, the granddaughter quit her job.12 The grandfather indeed paid her 
the promised allowance; however, when he died, the executor of his will 
refused to continue paying the granddaughter.13 The court enforced the 
grandfather’s promise, stating that “having intentionally influenced the 
plaintiff to alter her position for the worse on the faith of the note being 
paid when due, it would be grossly inequitable to permit the maker, or 
his executor, to resist payment on the ground that the promise was giv-
en without consideration.”14
This case demonstrates the importance of promissory estoppel.15
Enforcing the promise expands contract law beyond the bargain theory 
and beyond market transactions supported by consideration. Promissory 
estoppel in this case stretches contract law to include intra-family rela-
tions. Likewise, this case broadens contract law beyond efficiency and 
8. For economic analysis of promissory estoppel, see infra Part I.C.
9. For the bargain theory, see 3 ARTHUR LINTON CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS §
8.9 (Eric Mills Holmes ed., rev. ed. 1996); EDWARD ALLAN FARNSWORTH,
FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS § 2.19 (3d ed. 2004).
10. For the relations between the doctrine of consideration and the promissory estoppel
doctrine, see P. S. ATIYAH, CONSIDERATION IN CONTRACTS: A FUNDAMENTAL
RESTATEMENT 45-61 (1971); P. S. Atiyah, Consideration and Estoppel: The Thawing
of the Ice, 38 MOD. L. REV. 65 (1975); P. S. ATIYAH, THE RISE AND FALL OF
FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 777 (1979); Alex M. Johnson, Jr., Contracts and the Re-
quirement of Consideration: Positing a Unified Normative Theory of Contracts, Inter Vi-
vos and Testamentary Gift Transfers, 91 N.D. L. REV. 547 (2015).
11. Ricketts v. Scothorn, 77 N.W. 365 (Neb. 1898).
12. Ricketts, 77 N.W. at 366.
13. Ricketts, 77 N.W. at 366.
14. Ricketts, 77 N.W. at 367.
15. See infra Part III.H.
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utility maximization to incorporate promises motivated by love and car-
ing for another family member. Furthermore, promissory estoppel 
opens up contract law to the influences of social norms, in this case of a 
certain lifestyle. Promissory estoppel reveals how contracts are situated 
within a given social context, in this case social class. In addition, this 
case shows that sometimes family members might have different inter-
ests and perspectives. Lastly, this case demonstrates the importance of
gifts and donations.
As the brief analysis of Ricketts above demonstrates, feminist eco-
nomics is relevant to contract law generally. Feminist economics con-
tests dichotomies16: The inclusion of intra-family promises in contract 
law goes beyond commercial promises and thus refutes the family-
market binary; the enforcement of gifts made for love goes beyond utili-
ty maximization and thus refutes the economic-emotion binary; the in-
clusion of social norms and social context in contract analysis inherently 
refutes the private-public binary. Feminist economics compels contract 
law to take into account the social context, aspects, and effects of con-
tracts.17 Specifically, feminist economics sheds light on gender norms 
and how the economy is affected by the social context of patriarchy, dis-
crimination, and inequality. In other words, the dynamic between men 
and women is itself an important economic factor. Feminist economics 
renders promises between family members an integral part of contract 
law.18 These are general contributions to contract law that go beyond 
promissory estoppel.19
This Article has four parts. After briefly explaining the doctrine of 
promissory estoppel and Section 90 of the Restatement (Second) of 
Contracts, Part I reviews the literature on this doctrine. First, it explores 
the literature stressing the doctrine’s marginality, secondary place, and 
limited, narrow scope. Then it explores the literature emphasizing its 
importance, significance, and contribution to contract law. Part II brief-
ly explains feminist economics and its core theoretical tenets and fea-
tures. Based on the previous parts, Part III engages in a feminist eco-
nomic analysis of promissory estoppel, contributing to the debate over 
whether promissory estoppel is important by joining the scholars in Part 
I who answer in the affirmative. Part IV goes beyond promissory estop-
pel and shows how feminist economics can enrich contract law general-
16. Feminist economics critiques dichotomies and hierarchies in contract law, such as
private-public and home-market. See infra Part IV.C.
17. See infra Part IV.D.
18. See infra Part IV.E.
19. Infra Part IV.
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ly. This concluding part demonstrates that feminist economics is a valu-
able theory: It is relevant not only to promissory estoppel but also to 
other doctrines, core concepts, and values at the heart of contract law.
I. Promissory Estoppel
A. The Doctrine of Promissory Estoppel
Section 90 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts provides that
A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to 
induce action or forbearance on the part of the promisee or a 
third person and which does induce such action or forbear-
ance is binding if injustice can be avoided only by enforce-
ment of the promise. The remedy granted for breach may be 
limited as justice requires.20
Promissory estoppel has evolved as a mechanism to enforce non-
bargained-for, relied-upon promises.21 It is considered a secondary rule 
of enforceable promises and is viewed as a narrow and limited substitute
for consideration.22 While some scholars view promissory estoppel as a 
20. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTS. § 90 (AM. L. INST. 1981). For promissory es-
toppel under the UCC see, for example, Michael Gibson, Promissory Estoppel, Article
2 of the U.C.C., and the Restatement (Third) of Contracts, 73 IOWA L. REV. 659
(1988); Michael T. Gibson, Reliance Damages in the Law of Sales Under Article 2 of
the Uniform Commercial Code, 29 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 909 (1997). For promissory estoppel
in civil law see, for example, David V. Snyder, Comparative Law in Action: Promissory
Estoppel, the Civil Law, and the Mixed Jurisdiction, 15 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 695
(1998); Charles Calleros, Cause, Consideration, Promissory Estoppel, and Promises Un-
der Deed: What Our Students Should Know About Enforcement of Promises in a Histori-
cal and International Context, 13 CHI.-KENT J. INT’L & COMP. L. 83 (2013).
21. For the historic origins of promissory estoppel see, for example, Eric Alden, Promisso-
ry Estoppel and the Origins of Contract Law, 9 NE. U. L. REV. 1 (2017); Joel M.
Ngugi, Promissory Estoppel: The Life History of an Ideal Legal Transplant, 41 U. RICH.
L. REV. 425 (2007); Kevin M. Teeven, A History of Promissory Estoppel: Growth in the
Face of Doctrinal Resistance, 72 TENN. L. REV. 1111 (2005). For the development of
promissory estoppel see Eric Mills Holmes, The Four Phases of Promissory Estoppel, 20
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 45 (1996).
22. See, e.g., Glitsos v. Kadish, 418 P.2d 129, 131 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1966) (“The distinc-
tion, though narrow, is the difference between valid consideration on the one side,
and estoppel on the other, which, when the ends of justice so dictate, is a substitute
for consideration.”).
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contract law doctrine,23 according to other scholars, promissory estoppel 
goes beyond contractual liability.24 Promissory estoppel is categorized as 
a contract, tort, or equitable doctrine and classified, accordingly, as cre-
ating promise-based, assent-based, reliance-based, or equity-based liabil-
ity.25
The law requires that four elements be present in order to invoke 
the doctrine of promissory estoppel26:
1) There has to be a clear, definite, and unambiguous prom-
ise;
2) The promisor must have had reason to expect reliance on 
the promise;
3) The promise must have induced such reliance and a con-
sequent detrimental change of position; and
4) Injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the 
promise.27
Section 90 provides for a flexible remedy, “as justice requires.” 28 Indeed, 
some courts award reliance damages29 and other courts awarded expecta-
tion damages.30
23. For the relation between promissory estoppel and the parol evidence rule see, for ex-
ample, Michael B. Metzger, The Parol Evidence Rule: Promissory Estoppel’s Next Con-
quest?, 36 VAND. L. REV. 1383 (1983); David G. Epstein, Melinda Arbuckle & Kelly
Flanagan, Contract Law’s Two “P.E.’s”: Promissory Estoppel and the Parol Evidence
Rule, 62 BAYLOR L. REV. 397 (2010). For the relation between promissory estoppel
and the statute of frauds see, for example, Stephen J. Leacock, Fingerprints of Equita-
ble Estoppel and Promissory Estoppel on the Statute of Frauds in Contract Law, 2 WM. &
MARY BUS. L. REV. 73 (2011); David G. Epstein, Ryan D. Starbird & Joshua C.
Vincent, Reliance on Oral Promises: Statute of Frauds and “Promissory Estoppel,” 42
TEX. TECH L. REV. 913 (2010); Henry F. Luepke, III, Promissory Estoppel and the
Statute of Frauds in Missouri, 58 J. MO. B. 132 (2002).
24. Gan, supra note 5, at 56-64.
25. Id.
26. CORBIN, supra note 9, at § 8.9; FARNSWORTH, supra note 9, at § 2.19.
27. Orit Gan, The Justice Element of Promissory Estoppel, 89 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 55
(2015). See also Gerald Griffin Reidy, Note, Definite and Substantial Reliance: Reme-
dying Injustice Under Section 90, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 1217 (1998) (reviewing the
use of promissory estoppel to remedy injustice by enforcing relied-on promises).
28. Paul T. Wangerin, Damages for Reliance Across the Spectrum of Law: Of Blind Men
and Legal Elephants, 72 IOWA L. REV. 47, 49 (1986).
29. Warren A. Seavey, Reliance upon Gratuitous Promises or Other Conduct, 64 HARV. L.
REV. 913, 926 (1951).
30. See, e.g., Mary E. Becker, Promissory Estoppel Damages, 16 HOFSTRA L. REV. 131, 135
(1987) (“[C]ourts routinely award expectation damages unless those damages are too
speculative, indefinite, or otherwise unavailable under traditional contract rules.”);
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B. Promissory Estoppel Literature
The Restatement (Second) of Contracts adopted the bargain theory 
and primarily enforces promises supported by consideration.31 However, 
promissory estoppel provides an alternative basis for enforcement of 
non-bargained-for relied-upon promises.32 Promissory estoppel has 
evolved as a secondary rule of enforceable promises—a limited and nar-
row substitute for consideration. The main contract formation rule is 
based on consideration, while promissory estoppel functions as a backup 
rule for non-bargained-for promises.33 The literature on promissory es-
toppel is rich and diverse, taking different views on the relationship be-
tween the doctrine of consideration and promissory estoppel.34
One view is that promissory estoppel is an insignificant and limited 
doctrine, a mere substitute for the doctrine of consideration and a sec-
ondary doctrine of contract formation that deviates from contract law 
principles.35 Contract law scholar Charles Knapp describes promissory 
estoppel as “the new kid on the contracts block.”36 A related view stress-
es the difference between the doctrine of consideration and promissory 
W. David Rankin, Concerning an Expectancy Based Remedial Theory of Promissory Es-
toppel, 69 U. TORONTO FAC. L. REV. 116, 117 (2011) (“[N]umerous empirical and
jurisprudential studies confirm the judiciary’s proclivity toward treating gratuitous
promises as binding in certain circumstances, thereby protecting the expectation in-
terest engendered by them.”); Adam Ship, The Primacy of Expectancy in Estoppel Rem-
edies: An Historical and Empirical Analysis, 46 ALTA. L. REV. 77, 81 (2008) (“My con-
clusions disclose strong appellate judicial support in Canada, over the last 12 years,
for an expectation approach to estoppel.”).
31. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTS. § 71 (AM. L. INST. 1981) (“To constitute con-
sideration, a performance or a return promise must be bargained for.”). For critique
of the doctrine of consideration see, for example, Hila Keren, Considering Affective
Consideration, 40 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 165 (2010); Alan M. White, Stop Teach-
ing Consideration, 20 NEV. L.J. 503 (2020).
32. For the relation between the doctrine of consideration and the promissory estoppel
doctrine, see supra note 10.
33. See Eric Alden, Rethinking Promissory Estoppel, 16 NEV. L.J. 659, 661-64 (2016); Su-
san Lorde Martin, Kill the Monster: Promissory Estoppel as an Independent Cause of Ac-
tion, 7 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 1 (2016); Tory A. Weigand, Promissory Estoppel’s
Avoidance of Injustice and Measure of Damages: The Final Frontier, 23 SUFFOLK J.
TRIAL & APP. ADVOC. 1 (2017).
34. Richard Michael Fischl, Ideology and Argument Construction in Contract Law, in
RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON CRITICAL LEGAL THEORY 283 (Emilios Christodoulidis,
Ruth Dukes & Marco Goldoni eds., 2019).
35. Feinman, supra note 6, at 680; Weinstein, supra note 6, at 796; Hillman, supra note
6, at 581.
36. Charles L. Knapp, Rescuing Reliance: The Perils of Promissory Estoppel, 49 HASTINGS
L.J. 1191, 1274 (1998).
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estoppel.37 Contract law scholar Grant Gilmore describes the relations 
between consideration and reliance as the relation between “matter and 
anti-matter,” “Restatement and anti-Restatement,” and “Contract and 
anti-Contract.”38 Other scholars argue for a broad doctrine of considera-
tion, which would include promissory estoppel cases.39 According to an-
other view, promissory estoppel is not a contract doctrine,40 but rather a 
tort41 or equity doctrine.42
There is a body of scholarship that takes still another view of prom-
issory estoppel. According to these scholars, promissory estoppel is not 
insignificant,43 but rather broad and important.44 Scholars point to dif-
ferent reasons promissory estoppel is a significant doctrine of contract 
formation.
First, promissory estoppel is a favorable addition to the bargain 
theory.45 Some scholars support broadening the notion of contract lia-
37. Orvill C. Snyder, Promissory Estoppel in New York, 15 BROOK. L. REV. 27, 27-28
(1948).
38. GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 61 (1974).
39. Bruce MacDougall, Consideration and Estoppel: Problem and Panacea, 15 DALHOUSIE
L.J. 265 (1992).
40. Michael B. Metzger & Michael J. Phillips, The Emergence of Promissory Estoppel as an
Independent Theory of Recovery, 35 RUTGERS L. REV. 472 (1983). But see Willard L.
Boyd III & Robert K. Huffman, The Treatment of Implied-in-Law and Implied-in-
Fact Contracts and Promissory Estoppel in the United States Claims Court, 40 CATH. U.
L. REV. 605 (1991); Gary Shapiro, Note, C & K Engineering Contractors v. Amber
Steel Co.: Promissory Estoppel and the Right to Trial by Jury in California, 31
HASTINGS L.J. 697 (1980). For a relational approach, see, for example, Jay M. Fein-
man, The Last Promissory Estoppel Article, 61 FORDHAM L. REV. 303 (1992).
41. Orvill C. Snyder, Promissory Estoppel as Tort, 35 IOWA L. REV. 28 (1949). See also
Jean Fleming Powers, Promissory Estoppel and Wagging the Dog, 59 ARK. L. REV. 841
(2007); Susan M. Morgan, A Comparative Analysis of the Doctrine of Promissory Estop-
pel in Australia, Great Britain and the United States, 15 MELB. U. L. REV. 134 (1985);
Andrew Robertson, Situating Equitable Estoppel Within the Law of Obligations, 19
SYDNEY L. REV. 32 (1997).
42. Eric Mills Holmes, Restatement of Promissory Estoppel, 32 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 263,
277-84 (1996). See also William R. Collins, Comment, The Enigma of Promissory Es-
toppel in New York, 48 ALB. L. REV. 822 (1984).
43. Marco J. Jimenez, The Many Faces of Promissory Estoppel: An Empirical Analysis Under
the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, 57 UCLA L. REV. 669 (2010). But see Phuong
N. Pham, Note, The Waning of Promissory Estoppel, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 1263, 1270
(1994).
44. Wan Izatul Asma Wan Talaat, The Present Parameters of Promissory Estoppel and Its
Changing Role in the English, Australian and Malaysian Contract Law, 35 J.
MALAYSIAN & COMP. L. 39 (2008) (analyzing how courts broaden the doctrine of
promissory estoppel).
45. Gan, supra note 5, at 56.
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bility under the doctrine of consideration.46 Accordingly, contract for-
mation is not limited by the bargain theory, and reliance is also a basis 
for enforcing promises. Other scholars claim the enforcement of reli-
ance-based promises makes contract law less individualistic, abstract, 
and formalistic, and more flexible, contextual, and relational.47 Section 
90 uses the open-ended term “reliance” and provides for a flexible rem-
edy—as justice requires.48 Promissory estoppel, then, relaxes the formal 
rules of contract formation and provides that parties are estopped from 
denying the contract.
Second, promissory estoppel complements the bargain theory by 
addressing promises in non-bargain contexts.49 Some scholars claim that 
promissory estoppel covers areas outside the scope of doctrine of consid-
eration.50 Promissory estoppel is an alternative to consideration, where 
enforcement is based not only on free choice, but also on reliance, jus-
tice, and other public policies. Promissory estoppel complicates bargain 
theory’s simplistic logic of free choice, according to which enforceability 
of contract is based on the parties’ choice to be obligated.51 Enforcement 
of promises under promissory estoppel is based on reliance as an alterna-
tive to the doctrine of consideration.
46. Randy E. Barnett, The Death of Reliance, 46 J. LEGAL EDUC. 518, 522 (1996). See
also Randy E. Barnett, Foreword: Is Reliance Still Dead?, 38 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1
(2001). For Justice Cardozo’s broad doctrine of consideration that includes promisso-
ry estoppel promises, see Curtis Bridgeman, Allegheny College Revisited: Cardozo,
Consideration, and Formalism in Context, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 149 (2005); Joshua
P. Davis, Cardozo’s Judicial Craft and What Cases Come to Mean, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV.
777 (1993); Henry W. Humble, Promissory Estoppel in the Law of Contracts, 63 AM.
L. REV. 33 (1929); Mike Townsend, Cardozo’s Allegheny College Opinion: A Case
Study in Law as an Art, 33 HOUS. L. REV. 1103 (1996). For more broad notions of
consideration, see P. S. ATIYAH, ESSAYS ON CONTRACT 238 (1990); C.M.A.
McCauliff, A Historical Approach to the Contractual Ties That Bind Parties Together,
71 FORDHAM L. REV. 841, 864 (2002); Val D. Ricks, The Sophisticated Doctrine of
Consideration, 9 GEO. MASON L. REV. 99, 103-04 (2000).
47. See generally Michael B. Metzger & Michael J. Phillips, Promissory Estoppel and the
Evolution of Contract Law, 18 AM. BUS. L.J. 139 (1980).
48. Carolyn Edwards, Promissory Estoppel and the Avoidance of Injustice, 12 OKLA. CITY
U. L. REV. 223 (1987).
49. Michael I. Swygert & Donald W. Smucker, Promissory Estoppel in Florida: Growing
Recognition of Promissory Obligation, 16 STETSON L. REV. 1 (1986); James Gordley,
Enforcing Promises, 83 CALIF. L. REV. 547, 548 (1995).
50. Feinman, supra note 6, at 680.
51. Gillian K. Hadfield, An Expressive Theory of Contract: From Feminist Dilemmas to a
Reconceptualization of Rational Choice in Contract Law, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 1235
(1998).
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Third, promissory estoppel promotes efficiency.52 It encourages co-
operation, trust, and interdependence between the parties.53 This results 
in reducing opportunistic and predatory behavior during negotiations.54
In addition to promoting efficiency, promissory estoppel also promotes 
the fairness of contracts. It is an equitable tool to achieve justice when 
consideration is lacking or in the face of the misuse of formalities.55
Fourth, promissory estoppel enables courts to mitigate the power 
imbalance between parties and to monitor misuses of power.56 It reflects 
a more paternalistic and protectionist contract law and greater interven-
tion by the courts in contractual relations. For example, contract law 
scholar Juliet Kostritsky argues that promissory estoppel facilitates con-
tractual relations where a power imbalance, due to the respective status 
or knowledge of the parties, could have prevented the transaction.57
Lastly, promissory estoppel expands and strengthens the right to 
contract.58 “Promissory estoppel enables promisees to overcome obsta-
cles to meeting the formalities of the doctrine of consideration and to 
contract nevertheless.”59 Thus, promissory estoppel plays an important 
role in guaranteeing access to contract.
Feminist economics adds to this body of scholarship and highlights 
the importance of care, non-market interactions, and the influence of 
social norms (especially gender norms) on people’s choices and prefer-
ences.60 Feminist economics provides a fresh perspective and enriches 
promissory estoppel scholarship. The feminist economic analysis in this 
Article seeks to makes three primary contributions: First, based on this 
analysis, it argues that promissory estoppel is a broad and important 
doctrine and not an insignificant and secondary doctrine. Second, re-
52. For an economic analysis of promissory estoppel, see infra notes 61-73 and accompa-
nying text.
53. Daniel A. Farber & John H. Matheson, Beyond Promissory Estoppel: Contract Law and
the “Invisible Handshake,” 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 903, 942 (1985); Lon L. Fuller, Con-
sideration and Form, 41 COLUM. L. REV. 799, 823 (1941). See also John J. Chung,
Promissory Estoppel and the Protection of Interpersonal Trust, 56 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 37
(2008); Jay M. Feinman, The Meaning of Reliance: A Historical Perspective, 1984 WIS.
L. REV. 1373, 1387 (1984).
54. Juliet P. Kostritsky, Uncertainty, Reliance, Preliminary Negotiations and the Holdup
Problem, 61 SMU L. REV. 1377 (2008).
55. Carolyn Edwards, Freedom of Contract and Fundamental Fairness for Individual Par-
ties: The Tug of War Continues, 77 UMKC L. REV. 647 (2009).
56. Juliet P. Kostritsky, A New Theory of Assent-Based Liability Emerging Under the Guise
of Promissory Estoppel: An Explanation and Defense, 33 WAYNE L. REV. 895 (1987).
57. Id. at 911-13.
58. Gan, supra note 5.
59. Id. at 79.
60. See infra Part III.
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garding the relation between consideration and promissory estoppel, 
this analysis argues that the latter doctrine is a valuable supplement to 
the former. Third, this analysis challenges, expands, and enriches the 
classic economic analysis of promissory estoppel, which will be discussed 
in the next subpart. By adding a feminist perspective, this Article high-
lights the gender bias of mainstream economic analysis of promissory 
estoppel.
C. Economic Analysis of Promissory Estoppel
According to mainstream law and economics, promises that benefit 
both parties are enforceable.61 Courts enforce promises to promote effi-
cient outcomes and refuse to enforce promises that fail to promote wel-
fare maximization.62 Thus, promissory estoppel, like consideration, is a 
screening mechanism to enforce value enhancing promises.63 Promissory 
estoppel promotes optimal interactions between promisee and promisor. 
In other words, it makes both parties better off.64
As contract law scholars Charles Goetz and Robert Scott explain, 
“a promise may be enforceable to the extent that the promisee has in-
curred substantial costs, or conferred benefits, in reasonable reliance on 
the promise. Promissory estoppel under Section 90 of the Restatement 
of Contracts is the primary enforcement mechanism when action in re-
liance follows the promise.”65 Promissory estoppel promotes efficiency 
by enforcing promises that caused costs to the promisee.
Law and economics scholar Richard Posner argues that a promise 
“induce[s] reliance that cost[s] the promisee heavily when it [is] broken, 
and such a cost can be avoided for the future by holding such a promi-
sor liable for the promisee’s cost of having relied.”66 The enforceability 
of promises depends on whether imposing liability creates incentives for 
future value maximizing conduct.67 In a promissory estoppel case, a 
promise is enforceable to give parties incentives to behave efficiently. 
That is, both to induce the promisor to be careful in making a promise 
61. Juliet P. Kostritsky, The Rise and Fall of Promissory Estoppel or Is Promissory Estoppel
Really as Unsuccessful as Scholars Say It Is: A New Look at the Data, 37 WAKE FOREST
L. REV. 531, 532-33 (2002).
62. See id. at 538 n.37.
63. Id. at 566-67.
64. Id.
65. Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Enforcing Promises: An Examination of the Basis of
Contract, 89 YALE L.J. 1261, 1262 (1980).
66. POSNER, supra note 1, at 101.
67. Id.
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and to take into account the cost that the promise has on the promisee, 
as well as to induce the promisee to rely on the promise.68
Another reason to enforce promises is to prevent opportunism.69
Since the parties do not perform their duties under the contract simul-
taneously, the aim of contract law is to deter opportunistic behavior and 
to prevent promisors from taking advantage of promisees by making 
promises and then breaking them after reaping their benefits. Enforcing 
a promise under promissory estoppel deters opportunistic behavior of 
promisors by making them act upon their promises that the promisees 
reasonably relied on.
An additional reason to enforce promises is to allocate risks effi-
ciently between the parties. The question is: How would the parties 
themselves have resolved the issue had they foreseen it? Should the 
promisor assume the risk for the broken promise because she induced 
reliance? Or should the promisee assume the risk since her reliance was 
unreasonable? In the first instance the promise would be enforced and 
in the second the promise would not be enforced. The question of 
whether to enforce the promise also asks how to allocate the risk be-
tween the parties.
Furthermore, promissory estoppel is efficient since it protects the 
promisee’s investment.70 Promissory estoppel encourages efficient pre-
contractual investment by compensating for reliance during negotia-
tions. Promissory estoppel polices opportunistic behavior by not allow-
ing a promisor to benefit from the promisee’s reliance then deny the 
promise and refrain from acting upon it. In such cases, the promise 
would be enforceable, in order to promote the efficient reliance of the 
promisee. Promissory estoppel promotes mutual trust, which also en-
hances mutual gains for both parties.71
According to contract law scholar Richard Craswell:
The legal doctrines governing offer and acceptance can be in-
terpreted to prevent one party from withdrawing in just those 
cases where an enforceable commitment would have been 
68. For Posner’s analysis of promissory estoppel, see Douglas G. Baird, Unlikely Resurrec-
tion: Richard Posner, Promissory Estoppel, and the Death of Contract, 86 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1037 (2019).
69. Kostritsky, supra note 61, at 567.
70. Rebecca Stone & Alexander Stremitzer, Promises, Reliance, and Psychological Lock-In
49 J. LEGAL STUD. 33, 34-35 (2020) (finding that, in addition to deterring under-
investment, promissory estoppel reduces overreliance and overinvestment in negotia-
tions).
71. Kostritsky, supra note 61, at 567.
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necessary to induce an efficient level of reliance by the other 
party. In those cases, I argue, even the party who now seeks 
to withdraw would have wanted to be committed (if he or 
she had been asked that question at the time the other party 
had to rely), precisely in order to induce efficient reliance.72
Promissory estoppel then protects efficient reliance, which contract law 
scholar Avery Katz alludes to as well:
The efficiency of promissory estoppel in precontractual nego-
tiations turns on the relative bargaining power of the parties 
ex post. If offerors have the bargaining power, then holding 
them responsible for lost reliance under the estoppel doctrine 
promotes optimal reliance. If offerees have the bargaining 
power, then optimal reliance requires them to bear the risk of 
loss.73
Economic analysis of promissory estoppel concentrates on market trans-
actions and business negotiations. It also focuses on the parties and on 
efficiency and utility maximization. Feminist economics provides an al-
ternative economic analysis of promissory estoppel, looking beyond the 
parties to social norms (especially gender norms), and focusing instead 
on non-market agreements: activities such as caring, relations between 
household members, and intra-family agreements. Feminist economics 
acknowledges motivations beyond gain enhancement. Before delving 
into a feminist economic analysis of promissory estoppel, the next Part 
explains the theoretical foundations of feminist economics.
II. Feminist Economics
Feminist economics is a critical approach to mainstream neoliberal 
economics.74 It exposes the gendered aspects, biases, dimensions, and 
72. Richard Craswell, Offer, Acceptance, and Efficient Reliance, 48 STAN. L. REV. 481, 484
(1996) (exploring efficient reliance as an implicit economic rationale underlying
courts’ decisions in contract formation cases).
73. Avery Katz, When Should an Offer Stick?: The Economics of Promissory Estoppel in Pre-
liminary Negotiations, 105 YALE L.J. 1249, 1277 (1996). See also Lucian Arye Beb-
chuk & Omri Ben-Shahar, Precontractual Reliance, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 423, 430-39
(2001).
74. For feminist economics generally, see BEYOND ECONOMIC MAN: FEMINIST THEORY
AND ECONOMICS (Marianne A. Ferber & Julie A. Nelson eds., 1993); FEMINIST
ECONOMICS TODAY BEYOND ECONOMIC MAN (Marianne A. Ferber & Julie A. Nel-
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implications of the economy.75 While mainstream economics maintains 
that gender is irrelevant, feminist economics suggests that gender rela-
tions are an important part of the economy.76 Feminist economics exists 
in the intersection of economic theory and feminist theory, drawing 
from both of these worlds. It also combines economic and feminist 
methods and insights. Feminist economics is diverse, drawing from dif-
ferent schools within economics and from different schools within fem-
inism. It is not the case that feminist economics is economics for wom-
en while mainstream economics is economics for men. Rather, feminist 
economics is inclusive economics that goes beyond androcentric main-
stream economics.
By the 1990s, feminist economics had become widely recognized as 
an established subfield within economics.77 To date, there is rich schol-
arship in this field. For example, Feminist Economics was founded in the 
son eds., 2003); Irene van Staveren, Feminist Economics: Setting Out the Parameters, in
GENDER AND ECONOMICS 18 (Christine Bauhardt & Gülay Caglar eds., 2010);
FEMINIST ECONOMICS (Drucilla Barker & Edith Kuiper eds., 2010); MUKESH
ESWARAN, WHY GENDER MATTERS IN ECONOMICS (2014); JOYCE P. JACOBSEN, THE
ECONOMICS OF GENDER (3d ed., 2007); COUNTING ON MARILYN WARING: NEW
ADVANCES IN FEMINIST ECONOMICS (Bjørnholt, Margunn & Ailsa McKay eds., 2d
ed., 2014); FRONTIERS IN THE ECONOMICS OF GENDER, (Francesca Bettio & Alina
Verashchagina eds., 2008); INTRODUCING RACE AND GENDER INTO ECONOMICS
(Robin L. Bartlett ed., 1997); MICHÈLE A. PUJOL, FEMINISM AND ANTI-FEMINISM IN
EARLY ECONOMIC THOUGHT (1992); OUT OF THE MARGIN: FEMINIST
PERSPECTIVES ON ECONOMICS (Susan Feiner et al., eds., 1995); MARILYN WARING,
IF WOMEN COUNTED: A NEW FEMINIST ECONOMICS (1988); THE ELGAR
COMPANION TO FEMINIST ECONOMICS (Janice Peterson & Margaret Lewis eds.,
1999); TOWARD A FEMINIST PHILOSOPHY OF ECONOMICS (Drucilla K. Barker &
Edith Kuiper eds., 2003); Ann Mari May, The Feminist Challenge to Economics, 45
CHALLENGE 45 (2002).
For feminist critique of law and economics, see, for example, Gillian K. Had-
field, Feminism, Fairness, and Welfare: An Invitation to Feminist Law and Economics, 1
ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCIENCE 283 (2005); Gillian K. Hadfield, Households at Work:
Beyond Labor Market Policies to Remedy the Gender Gap, 82 GEO. L.J. 89 (1993);
Gillian K. Hadfield, A Coordination Model of the Sexual Division of Labor, 40 J. ECO.
BEHAV. & ORG. 125 (1999); FEMINISM CONFRONTS HOMO ECONOMICUS: GENDER,
LAW AND SOCIETY (Martha Albertson Fineman & Terence Dougherty eds., 2005);
LAW AND ECONOMICS: ALTERNATIVE ECONOMIC APPROACHES TO LEGAL AND
REGULATORY ISSUES (Margaret Oppenheimer & Nicholas Mercuro eds., 2005).
75. Susan Himmelweit, Feminist Economics: Why All Economists Should Be Feminist Econ-
omists, in RETHINKING ECONOMICS: AN INTRODUCTION TO PLURALIST ECONOMICS
60, 61 (Liliann Fischer et al. eds., 2017).
76. Id. at 61.
77. Daniele Meulders, Feminist Economics, in INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE
SOCIAL AND BEHAVIORAL STUDIES SCIENCES 5451, 5451 (Neil J. Smelser & Paul B.
Baltes eds., 2001).
16 michigan  jo urn al  o f  g ender & la w [Vol. 28:1
mid 1990s and is by now a prestigious journal. As economics scholar 
Cahal Moran notes:
Feminist economics is a key component of the movement for 
pluralism in economics and one that has, to some extent, 
been acknowledged by the mainstream of the profession. It 
seeks to highlight issues which affect women because (it 
claims) they have not traditionally been recognized in a field 
dominated by men.78
Two major themes of feminist economics are unpaid labor, mostly done 
by women, and discrimination women face in the economy.79
Like other schools of heterodox80 economics, feminist economics 
challenges mainstream neoclassical economics. Though mainstream 
economics itself has evolved over the years, its male bias is still acute.81
Feminist economics thus challenges the foundation of mainstream eco-
nomics in the following ways.82
A. Care Work
Mainstream economics either ignores care work or analyzes care 
work as a commodity. Feminist economics highlights the differences be-
tween care work83 and the production and manufacture of goods.84 For 
example, care work involves a personal relationship between the care 
worker and the person cared for. Care work is also influenced by social 
norms.85 Thus, feminist economics critiques mainstream economics for 
measuring productivity, supply, and demand of care work like any other
commodity. Feminist economics goes beyond paid work and produc-
78. Cahal Moran, Why Feminist Economics Is Necessary, EXPLORING ECONOMICS:
RETHINKING ECONOMICS (2020), https://www.exploring-economics.org/en/discover
/Why-feministeconomics-is-necessary/ [https://perma.cc/72VU-AV4J].
79. Id.
80. David Dequech, Neoclassical, Mainstream, Orthodox, and Heterodox Economics, 30 J.
POST KEYNESIAN ECON. 279 (2007).
81. Himmelweit, supra note 75, at 62.
82. Id.
83. Care work is the hands-on services that children and some adults (like elderly or disa-
bled individuals) require. These services are tailored specifically to individuals’ needs,
and involve tasks that others—who do not require care—can do by themselves. Care
work can be both paid and unpaid.
84. Himmelweit, supra note 75, at 69.
85. See infra Part II.E.
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tion and, unlike mainstream economics, focuses on care work.86 Care 
work is mostly done by women, which results in inequalities in both 
employment and the family.87 Thus, care work is gendered. Feminist 
economics asks questions such as: Who does the care work? (Private 
market entities? Public state entities? Family members? The community? 
Immigrant workers?) For whom and under what conditions? (How 
much are care workers paid?) What is good care work? How to measure 
the quality of care work? The analysis of care work found in feminist 
economics is relevant and applicable to housework and other types of 
unpaid work.88 Feminist economics exposes the gendered nature of care 
work and housework and highlights their importance to the economy.
B. Non-Market
Some mainstream economics theories ignore non-market activi-
ties.89 For example, the GDP does not count domestic work.90 Other 
mainstream economic theories apply the same economic rules and as-
sumptions to non-market activities.91 As people interact in different 
manners, feminist economics goes beyond the market to include fami-
lies and communities. Feminist economics then questions who partici-
pates in the market? On what terms? Who has non-market obligations, 
such as housework and care work? Feminist economics claims that 
housework, which is most often women’s work, is part of the econo-
my.92 While men also engage in such non-market activities, the fact is 
that they remain primarily carried out by women,93 which underscores 
the gendered bias of classical economics’ limited view of accounting on-
86. Nancy Folbre, Measuring Care: Gender, Empowerment, and the Care Economy, 7 J.
HUM. DEV. 183 (2006); Helen Mussell, Who Dares to Care? (In the World of Finance),
24 FEMINIST ECON. 113 (2018); Rachel Connelly, Xiao-yuan Dong, Joyce Jacobsen
& Yaohui Zhao, The Care Economy in Post-Reform China: Feminist Research on Un-
paid and Paid Work and Well-Being, 24 FEMINIST ECON. 1 (2018).
87. Nancy Folbre, The Care Penalty and Gender Inequality, in OXFORD HANDBOOK
WOMEN & ECONOMICS 749 (Susan L. Averett et al. eds., 2017).
88. Himmelweit, supra note 75, at 61-72.
89. Non-market activities include, for example, domestic work and housework (such as
cleaning, cooking, and caring for children).
90. Himmelweit, supra note 75, at 64.
91. GARY S. BECKER, A TREATISE OF THE FAMILY 3-4 (1991); RICHARD A. POSNER, SEX
AND REASON 85 (1992).
92. KATRINE MARÇAL, WHO COOKED ADAM SMITH’S DINNER? (Saskia Vogel trans.,
2016); Gabrielle Meagher & Julie A. Nelson, Survey Article: Feminism in the Dismal
Science, 12 J. POL. PHIL. 102 (2004).
93. See Himmelweit, supra note 75, at 63.
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ly for the market. Moreover, the market and the home are interrelated. 
For example, housework obligations leave less time for employment or 
engagement in other market activities.
Though some mainstream economics theories address non-market 
activities,94 feminist economics points specifically to the gendered nature 
of these activities and to their importance to the economy.
C. Economic Man
Mainstream economics95 holds the assumption of the individual 
economic man who is a selfish and rational utility maximizer as its mod-
el.96 Though subject to heavy critique, this model remains influential in 
economic analysis.97 This model is a reflection of hegemonic privileged 
men and excludes other men and women. Holding that people are not 
self-centered but rather interdependent, feminist economics goes be-
yond the model of the economic man.98 It presents a fuller and richer 
model of both men’s and women’s interactions and autonomy.99 It sug-
gests that human beings are complex and not solely influenced by mate-
rial factors.100 People are more than just rational individuals. We coop-
erate. We are interdependent. We are part of a community or society. 
Our behavior is a response to both nonmaterial and material incentives. 
Feminist economics challenges the gendered bias of the economic man 
model and offers an alternative: a holistic vision of the economic actor, 
motivated by a variety of factors, and behaving in different forms and 
not only according to one model.101
D. Household Members
While mainstream economics focuses on the household as a unit, 
feminist economics focuses on each family member and their different 
94. See BECKER, supra note 91; POSNER, supra note 91.
95. See generally Dequech, supra note 80, at 281-92.
96. Ulla Grapard, Robinson Crusoe: The Quintessential Economic Man?, in ROBINSON
CRUSOE’S ECONOMIC MAN: A CONSTRUCTION AND DECONSTRUCTION 93 (Ulla
Grapard & Gillian Hewitson eds., 2011).
97. Id. at 93-99.
98. Himmelweit, supra note 75, at 63.
99. See Stephanie Seguino, Thomas Stevens & Mark A. Lutz, Gender and Cooperative
Behavior: Economic Man Rides Alone, 2 FEMINIST ECON. 1, 8 (1996).
100. Id.
101. Id.
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interests or preferences.102 These two views of the household are poign-
antly divergent; for example, individual income taxes (taxing individu-
als) are different from family income taxes (taxing the family unit rather 
than individuals), and the former usually benefit women more than the 
latter.103 Feminist economics looks at the different gender roles women 
and men have in the family and the way resources are shared unequally 
in the household.104 Rather than a simplistic view, feminist economics 
suggests a more complex view of the household.105 Feminist economics 
exposes the gendered aspects of the household.
E. Social Norms
Mainstream economics assumes that individuals are rational and 
thus that their decisions reflect their choices and preferences.106 These 
preferences are held to be stable and unrelated to society.107 Moreover, 
these preferences are taken as a given and are not questioned.108 Feminist 
economics challenges these assumptions. Feminist economics stresses 
that people are not rational utility maximizers and that their preferences 
cannot be seen as preordained.109 People’s preferences are influenced by 
social norms and are not static but rather are constantly changing.110
The individual is not separate from society. Rather, there are complex 
relations between the individual and society, where society affects the 
individual and vice versa. Feminist economics especially stresses the way 
in which gender norms shape women’s and men’s choices, preferences, 
and options.111 In other words, social conditions of patriarchy, inequali-
ty, and discrimination influence how both women and men economi-
cally perform and function. Social norms might sometimes limit peo-
ple’s choices, and people’s choices might change social norms.
102. Himmelweit, supra note 75, at 66.
103. Id.
104. See id. at 65-66.
105. See Susan Himmelweit, Cristina Santos, Almudena Sevila & Catherine Sofer, Sharing
of Resources Within the Family and the Economics of Household Decision-Making, 75 J.
MARRIAGE & FAM. 625 (2013).
106. Himmelweit, supra note 75, at 66.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 67.
110. See Rebecca Pearse & Raewyn Connell, Gender Norms and the Economy: Insights from
Social Research, 22 FEMINIST ECON. 30 (2016); Himmelweit, supra note 75, at 67.
111. Himmelweit, supra note 75, at 67.
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For example, the employment rate of mothers of young children is 
influenced by social attitudes and norms regarding employment and 
motherhood. At the same time, as more mothers of young children en-
ter the workforce, these social attitudes and norms change.112 Though 
other economic schools have also pointed to the importance of social 
norms,113 the masculine model of economics is still dominant, and fem-
inist economics places particular emphasis on the importance of gender 
norms to economic analysis.114
F. Well-Being
According to feminist economics, well-being is not limited to 
monetary gains.115 For example, living in a caring and equal society and 
living in a society with good health and education systems each increase 
the well-being of women and men and of individuals and society writ 
large.116 Though other economic schools have advocated for broadening 
the analysis of well-being,117 feminist economics in particular has chal-
lenged the gendered aspects of well-being.118 It is not sufficient to ac-
count for women’s well-being in addition to men’s. Rather, it is critical 
to profoundly alter the very definition of well-being to include women’s 
perspectives on the concept.
This Article has described mainstream economics in very broad, 
general strokes, and has not sought to account for differences between 
various economic theories. Similarly, this Article has portrayed only the 
most general tenets of feminist economics, without addressing the dif-
ferent approaches within feminist economics. Furthermore, though fem-
inist economics has theoretical dimensions as well as political,119 meth-
odological,120 pedagogical,121 and epistemological122 dimensions, this 
112. Id. at 67-78.
113. See, e.g., Jon Elster, Social Norms and Economic Theory, 3 J. ECON. PERSP. 99-101
(1989).
114. Himmelweit, supra note 75.
115. Myra H. Strober, Rethinking Economics Through a Feminist Lens, 84 AM. ECON. REV.
143 (1994). See generally J. Allister McGregor & Nicky Pouw, Towards an Economics
of Wellbeing, 41 CAMBRIDGE J. ECON. 1123 (2016).
116. Himmelweit, supra note 75, at 72.
117. See, e.g., McGregor & Pouw, supra note 115.
118. Himmelweit, supra note 75, at 72.
119. See, e.g., Astrid Agenjo-Calderón & Lina Gálvez-Muñoz, Feminist Economics: Theo-
retical and Political Dimensions, 78 AM. J. ECON. & SOCIO. 137, 138-9 (2019).
120. See, e.g., Diana Strassmann, Expanding the Methodological Boundaries of Economics, 3
FEMINIST ECON., at i, vii-viii (1997); Diana Strassmann, Feminist Economic Method-
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Article focuses exclusively on the theoretical. With that, alongside this 
absence of certain nuances, this Article provides a broad picture of the 
contrast between mainstream economics and feminist economics.
As noted, feminist economics is not the only heterodox economic 
school, and there are other approaches to economics that challenge 
mainstream economics. However, feminist economics is an important 
critique of the dominant approach to economics. Feminist economics 
documents the differences in well-being between men and women, ad-
vocates policies which will promote equity, and conducts research free 
from androcentric bias.123
Feminist economics, then, combines insights from both economics 
and feminist theory. The “feminist” in feminist economics means that 
feminist economics seeks to challenge mainstream economics from a ho-
listic feminist perspective. Not only does feminist economics broaden 
mainstream economics to include women, but it also disputes the basis 
of mainstream economics. It challenges mainstream economics’ pur-
ported objectivity and neutrality and exposes the male biases and andro-
centricity of mainstream economics. It calls into question the theoretical 
foundations of mainstream economics and does not make do with mere-
ly including women, but rather insists on including gender and gender 
analysis in a profound, substantive manner. Feminist economics exposes 
the ways in which the entire economy is gendered.
The “economics” in feminist economics means that feminist eco-
nomics exposes the economic nature of institutions (like family) that are 
viewed as existing outside of the economy. It challenges the limited and 
narrow scope of mainstream economics that ignores women’s work. It 
unveils the economics of women’s labor. This makes feminist economics 
a unique school of feminist analysis. Just as some feminist theories focus 
on identity, equality, sexuality, or power, feminist economics addresses 
the economics of gender.124
ologies, 14 FEMINIST ECON. 1, 1-2 (2008); Sheba Tejani, What’s Feminist About Fem-
inist Economics?, 26 J. ECON. METHODOLOGY 99 (2019).
121. See, e.g., Margaret Lewis & Kim Marie McGoldrick, Moving Beyond the Masculine
Neoclassical Classroom, 7 FEMINIST ECON. 91 (2001); April Laskey Aerni, Robin L.
Bartlett, Margaret Lewis, Kim Marie McGoldrick & Jean Shackelford, Toward a
Feminist Pedagogy in Economics, 5 FEMINIST ECON. 29 (1999).
122. See, e.g., Janet Seiz, Epistemology and the Tasks of Feminist Economics, 1 FEMINIST
ECON. 110 (1995).
123. Frances R. Woolley, The Feminist Challenge to Neoclassical Economics, 17 CAMBRIDGE
J. ECON. 485 (1993).
124. See Nancy Fraser, Feminism, Capitalism, and the Cunning of History, 56 NEW LEFT
REV. 97 (2009) (containing a feminist critique of capitalism).
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Though other critical approaches to contract law, such as relational 
contract law for example, share some insights with feminist economics, 
they lack the aforementioned feminist and economic aspects. In other 
words, feminist economics, while not the only critical perspective on 
contract law, is unique in its ability to challenge the gendered aspects of 
contract law. Relational theory of contract law, to continue with the 
above example, addresses social aspects of contract law, but fails to ad-
dress its gender bias and the economic impact of such bias. Relational 
theory likewise addresses economic imbalance of power between parties, 
but fails to address power dynamics that result from patriarchy. Thus, 
the perspectives on contract law found within feminist economics are 
valuable even in cases in which said perspectives overlap with other criti-
cal theories.
III. A Feminist Economic Analysis of Promissory Estoppel
Formation of contract under the bargain theory focuses on market 
transactions. Classic contract law envisions rational parties who contract 
in order to maximize utility.125 Promissory estoppel is an alternative 
route to formation that opens contract law to other non-market rela-
tions and to social policy considerations.126 Applying the principles of 
feminist economics to promissory estoppel reveals how promissory es-
toppel broadens contract law: Formation of contract is not limited to 
consideration and to bargain, enforceable promises are not limited to 
the market sphere, and parties’ motivations are not limited to wealth 
maximization. Rather, promissory estoppel promotes cooperation, trust, 
altruism, and caring; it integrates reliance, justice, fairness, and relation-
ships into contracts; and it includes agreements between family mem-
bers as an integral part of contract law.
Promissory estoppel also makes contract law more pluralistic and 
inclusive. Promissory estoppel broadens contract law to include wom-
en’s interests and perspectives as an integral part of the economy. At the 
same time promissory estoppel challenges the gendered bias of econom-
ics under the doctrine of consideration by adding non-market activities.
125. See POSNER, supra note 1.
126. Gan, supra note 5, at 48.
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A. Borelli v. Brusseau
In Borelli v. Brusseau,127 a husband was very ill and wished to be 
cared for at home by his wife rather than by nurses in a hospital.128 He 
promised to transfer some of his personal property to his wife in ex-
change for her care.129 She performed her promised duties and took care 
of him until his death.130 Yet, he did not carry out his end of the deal, 
and he instead left his property to his daughter in his will.131 The court 
concluded there was no binding contract due to lack of consideration, 
ruling that “personal performance of a personal duty created by the con-
tract of marriage does not constitute a new consideration supporting the 
indebtedness, alleged in this case.”132 The dissent held that the wife’s
care work satisfied the required consideration, and thus an enforceable 
contract was made between the husband and wife.133 Promissory estop-
pel was not discussed. However, the following application of feminist 
economic analysis shows why the court should have applied promissory 
estoppel in order to enforce the promise in this case.
B. Valuing Care Work
The court’s decision in Borelli not only denies the wife’s right to 
receive the money promised to her, but also disregards and devalues her 
care work itself. It views her care work as part of her marital duties,134
and thus not as something substantive or worthy of note. It is not some-
thing she might exchange for reciprocal value. According to the majori-
ty, the woman in this case did nothing more than act as a good, obedi-
ent wife.135 Alternatively, the enforcement of the promise using 
promissory estoppel would give the care work value and importance. It 
would bestow high regard upon the labor of caring, and as a result, 
would award the wife the compensation promised for her care work. As 
127. Borrelli v. Brusseau, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d 16 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993).
128. Borelli, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 17-18.
129. Borelli, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 17-18.
130. Borelli, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 18.
131. Borelli, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 18.
132. Borelli, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 20.
133. Borelli, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 20, 25. This case is still good law. It is cited by In re Mar-
riage of Bonds, 24 Cal. 4th 1, 25 (2000); Estate of Stewart, No. A148396, 2019 WL
1746687, at *21 n.20 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 18, 2019).
134. Borelli, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 19.
135. See Borelli, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 19 (“[A] wife is obligated by the marriage contract to
provide nursing-type care to an ill husband.”).
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the dissent showed in this case,136 the wife did something well beyond 
her marital duties.
It might seem that awarding the wife compensation devalues her 
care work in that it treats her primarily as a nurse, rather than as a wife. 
Doing care work for love, it might be argued, is morally superior to do-
ing so for money. However, awarding the wife compensation for her 
role as a nurse does not undermine the moral value of her role as a lov-
ing wife. The wife, in this case, provided care work both out of love and 
with the anticipation that she would be fairly compensated. These moti-
vations coexist and are not mutually exclusive. Commodification con-
siderations are valuable considerations, but enforcing the promise in a 
case like this would neither commodify the wife’s care work nor degrade 
it. By enforcing the promise, the court would validate the values both 
parties attached to the wife’s care work. Enforcing the contract would 
not mean treating the wife’s caring as a commodity provided with no 
emotions, or strictly as part of her professional duties. Awarding the wife 
the promised property would not mean she did not care for her husband 
or that she acted as a professional nurse.137 Women’s right to contract 
with their husbands or others (a right women earned in the 19th centu-
ry)138 is an important economic right that enhances women’s autonomy. 
The contract in this case should be treated like any other marital agree-
ment, which can be enforced without devaluing the love relations of the 
couple.
136. Borelli, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 24.
137. For a feminist economics analysis of care work done by professional nurses, see Va-
lerie Adams & Rhonda Sharp, Reciprocity in Caring Labor: Nurses’ Work in Residential
Aged Care in Australia, 19 FEMINIST ECON. 100 (2013); Valerie Adams & Julie A.
Nelson, The Economics of Nursing: Articulating Care, 15 FEMINIST ECON. 3 (2009);
Julie A. Nelson & Nancy Folbre, Why a Well-Paid Nurse Is a Better Nurse, 24 NURSE
ECON. 127 (2006); Lisa Dodson & Rebekah M. Zincavage, “It’s Like a Family”: Car-
ing Labor, Exploitation, and Race in Nursing Homes, 21 GENDER & SOC’Y 905
(2007).
For the commodification of housework, see Katharine Silbaugh, Commodifica-
tion and Women’s Household Labor, 9 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 81 (1997); Katharine
Silbaugh, Turning Labor into Love: Housework and the Law, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 1
(1996).
138. Richard H. Chused, Married Women’s Property and Inheritance by Widows in Massa-
chusetts: A Study of Wills Probated Between 1800 and 1850, 2 BERKELEY WOMEN’S
L.J. 42 (1986); Richard H. Chused, Married Women’s Property Law: 1800-1850, 71
GEO. L.J. 1359 (1983).
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C. Enforcing Intra-Family Promises
The court’s decision in Borelli excludes promises between spouses, 
since personal performance of marital duties does not qualify as consid-
eration.139 The court thus maintains the market-family dichotomy. This 
leaves intra-family promises outside the scope of contract law. Enforcing 
a promise under promissory estoppel broadens contract law beyond the 
market. Promises in the intra-family context should also be binding. As 
the dissent pointed out, had the wife been a professional nurse and not 
the husband’s wife, her care work would qualify as consideration and his 
promise would have been enforceable.140 People relate to one another in 
different ways, not only through the market. Consideration narrowly 
values only one such way and excludes all others. Promissory estoppel, 
on the other hand, supplements the doctrine of consideration and in-
cludes in its scope other relations, and thus broadens contract law.
It might appear that enforcing intra-family promises using promis-
sory estoppel still maintains hierarchy. Commercial promises will be en-
forced under the doctrine of consideration, while familial promises will 
be enforced by a separate doctrine of promissory estoppel. In this view, 
consideration is the main doctrine of contract formation, while promis-
sory estoppel remains a secondary doctrine. In other words, if considera-
tion is the main entrance to the contract world, the wife (and other 
women) could use promissory estoppel as the back door to enter into 
the contract world.
However, having an alternative doctrine of contract formation does 
not necessarily mean that there will be a hierarchy. Consideration and 
promissory estoppel are, in fact, two equal doctrines. In some cases, 
both apply and promisees argue that the promise should be enforced 
under either doctrine.141 Some scholars point out that both considera-
tion and promissory estoppel serve the same screening goal: They both 
distinguish enforceable from unenforceable promises.142 Other scholars 
call for uniting both doctrines into a single doctrine.143 Having two 
formation doctrines side by side does not necessarily entail hierarchy: 
Both can be seen as main doors to the contract world.
139. Borelli, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 20.
140. Borelli, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 23.
141. Stanley D. Henderson, Promissory Estoppel and Traditional Contract Doctrine, 78
YALE L.J. 343, 352 (1969).
142. See, e.g., Edward Yorio & Steve Thel, The Promissory Basis of Section 90, 101 YALE
L.J. 111, 113 (1991).
143. See, e.g., Farber & Matheson, supra note 53, at 905.
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D. Love as Motivation to Contract
The court decision in Borelli saw the wife’s care work as part of her 
marital duties and thus not subject to contract.144 Promissory estoppel 
acknowledges the existence of relations other than market relations, rec-
ognizes different motivations for contracting other than utility maximi-
zation, and acknowledges that there are gains other than monetary ones.
The wife in this case was motivated by her love for her husband, 
but this motivation should not be left outside the scope of contract 
law.145 She was not a selfish, rational, utility-maximizing individual; ra-
ther, their agreement reflects a relationship of trust, mutual respect, and 
interdependence. The wife acted in a manner that was based on her love 
for her husband, as well as for the sake of the money promised. Her ex-
ample demonstrated that people act not only as rational wealth-
maximizers, but also for other non-monetary reasons.
People are complex and behave out of more than one motivation. 
The court imposed a binary: The wife either contracted for money or 
acted on the basis of her marital duties. Promissory estoppel is an alter-
native rationale, which demonstrates that both are true in her case. Her 
love for her husband does not negate the fact that she deserves to be 
awarded the money promised to her. These motivations of love and the 
property promised are not mutually exclusive to one another: They can 
and often do live side by side. Rather than employing binary thinking 
according to which one either acts in the market sphere for selfish moti-
vations or one acts in the family sphere for love, feminist economics 
provides a more complex—and humanly accurate—picture in which 
people may act for both reasons.146 In other words, family members may 
act for economic considerations, and so too may commercial parties act 
for non-monetary considerations. In both contexts, people act on the 
basis of more than one motivation.
144. Borelli, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 21.
145. For incorporating values such as love and caring into contract law, see Linda Mul-
cahy, The Limitations of Love and Altruism, in FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES ON
CONTRACT LAW 1 (Linda Mulcahy & Sally Wheeler eds., 2005).
146. Nancy Folbre & Julie A. Nelson, For Love or Money—or Both?, 14 J. ECON. PERSPS.
123 (2000); Julie A. Nelson, For Love or Money? Defining Relationships in Law and
Life: Does Profit-Seeking Rule Out Love? Evidence (or Not) from Economics and Law, 35
WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 69 (2011).
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E. Acknowledging Different Interests of Different Family Members
Borelli also demonstrates that different family members often have 
different interests. The suit revealed a conflict of interests between the 
spouses: Both wanted the husband’s property, and while the husband 
wished to be nursed by wife at home, she preferred that he would re-
main instead in the hospital.147 The dissent hints at the fact that the wife 
contemplated divorcing her husband due to his health condition, but 
she ultimately chose instead to stay married to him and to take care of 
him until his death.148 Their agreement amounted to a compromise be-
tween these different interests and preferences. Yet the court did not en-
force this compromise,149 valuing only the husband’s interests and pref-
erences.
Rather than automatically assuming domestic harmony, the law 
should directly address conflicts between spouses, as did the dissent.150
In this vein, the dissent respected the compromise the couple reached. 
The imposed view of automatically supposed harmony obscures the 
power dynamics in this family: The wife performed her promise and 
cared for her husband, while the husband did not perform his end of 
the deal, though he benefited from his wife’s care work. The harmony, 
in this case, is actually simply the rule of the stronger party, and is thus a 
false harmony.
The majority in Borelli perpetuated this grave imbalance. Because 
the majority automatically assumed the existence of unified, shared fa-
milial interests, it was unable to see the wife’s separate interests. The dis-
sent, however, would have mitigated this disparity by recognizing the 
conflict of interests between the parties, enforcing the compromise they 
reached, and awarding the wife the promised property. The dissent bal-
anced the different interests between two contracting parties and sought 
to correct the uneven distribution caused by the husband’s breach of his 
promise. As noted earlier, the household is not a unit but rather is com-
posed of different members who may have conflicting interests.151 The 
dissent in Borelli shows that contract law can be a tool to resolve this 
conflict of interests.
147. Borelli, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 17.
148. Borelli, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 24.
149. Borelli, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 20.
150. Borelli, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 22.
151. See supra Part II.D.
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F. Acknowledging Social Norms
The case of Borelli v. Brusseau demonstrates that social norms—
and especially gender norms—influence the parties’ contract. The power 
dynamics between the spouses necessarily shape their agreement. The 
husband had more money than the wife,152 such that he could purchase 
the wife’s nursing and care work. She acted as a dutiful wife, cared for 
her husband, and looked after him until he died. In order to understand 
their agreement, we need to look at the social background. Gender roles 
and social expectations shaped their agreement. The wife’s decision to 
care for her husband was influenced by social norms and expectations of 
married women.
The contract is not an island isolated from its surroundings. A con-
tract is rooted in its social context. Entering the oral agreement was not 
simply the result of the wife’s calculation and analysis of costs and bene-
fits, but also derived from the societal gender role of a wife. It is no co-
incidence that it is the wife taking care of her husband and not the other 
way around.
Furthermore, one has to consider the power dynamics between 
men and women. Gender relations within the family are the back-
ground for the agreement between wife and husband. With that, even if 
it were a husband taking care of his wife, the promise should still be en-
forced under the doctrine of promissory estoppel. Care work, which is 
mostly done by women, is undervalued and should receive economic 
and social appreciation, whether done by women or men.153
It seems that the court was influenced by gender roles in marriage. 
According to the majority, the wife simply performed her marital du-
ties.154 Promissory estoppel demonstrates alternative social norms ac-
cording to which care work is valuable and, even when done with love, 
deserves compensation. The dissent pointed to the old precedents upon 
which the majority relied in order to stress that this ruling was based on 
archaic notions regarding marriage.155 Social norms have changed and 
these updated norms should apply to the parties’ agreement. Today, 
spouses enter contracts with one another and make marital and other 
152. Borelli, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 17.
153. See Cary C. Franklin, The Anti-Stereotyping Principle in Constitutional Sex Discrimina-
tion Law, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 83 (2010) (highlighting how Ruth Bader Ginsburg ad-
vanced anti-stereotyping theory to promote equality for women by first advocating
the theory in sex discrimination cases where men were the plaintiffs).
154. Borelli, 16 Cal. Rptr. at 19.
155. Borelli, 16 Cal. Rptr. at 24.
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agreements. In fact, the couple in Borelli signed a prenuptial agree-
ment.156
The dissent used the Clintons’ marriage to stress how the majori-
ty’s concept of marriage is outdated.157 According to the dissent, “To
contend in 1993 that such a contract is without consideration means 
that if Mrs. Clinton becomes ill, President Clinton must drop every-
thing and personally care for her.”158 The Clinton example exposes the 
gender bias of the majority. The care that is expected of the wife seems 
odd when applied to President Clinton. Though the majority uses gen-
der neutral language, the dissent’s role reversal (Secretary Clinton needs 
President Clinton’s care) reveals that the majority’s ruling is based on 
social roles and social expectations that apply to women but not to men. 
According to the dissent, care work, whether done by women or men, 
qualifies as consideration.159
The majority stressed that marital contracts are different from oth-
er contracts since there is public interest in marriage.160 However, the 
majority failed to consider the influences of society on the marital con-
tract. According to the majority, each spouse has a duty to care for the 
other spouse.161 The majority’s gender-neutral statement disregards both 
gender roles in marriage and social perceptions of husbands and wives, 
and the resultant expectations from each group.
Borelli might appear to be a modification of contract case. Accord-
ing to this analysis, the husband and wife had a marriage agreement ob-
ligating the wife to take care of her husband. The wife wanted to modify 
this agreement to include the husband’s obligation to transfer the prop-
erty to her. Since this is a duress case in which the wife wanted to extort 
extra compensation beyond the original agreed upon compensation, the 
modified agreement is unenforceable. There should be no consideration 
for this contract modification. The wife’s care work must be seen as her 
obligation under the original contract, and she did not provide new 
consideration for the modified contract. Therefore, under this perspec-
tive, this contract is not enforceable.
However, it should be noted that even under this interpretation of 
the case, one still needs to look at social norms in order to determine the 
156. Borelli, 16 Cal. Rptr. at 17.
157. Borelli, 16 Cal. Rptr. at 24.
158. Borelli, 16 Cal. Rptr. at 24.
159. Borelli, 16 Cal. Rptr. at 24.
160. Borelli, 16 Cal. Rptr. at 19 (“It is fundamental that a marriage contract differs from
other contractual relations in that there exists a definite and vital public interest in
reference to the marriage relation.”).
161. Borelli, 16 Cal. Rptr. at 20.
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spouses’ obligations to one another under the marriage contract—that 
is, the original contract. The contract modification reading of the case is 
also based on societal conceptions of marital contract.
This case demonstrates that marriage is a social institution, one 
that changes over time. Marriage has many meanings: It is a coverture, a 
status, a contract; it is about love, it is about money; it is a relation be-
tween two people, it is a relation between two families, it is the creation 
of a new family; it once referred only to heterosexual couples but now 
includes same-sex couples. More meanings could be added to this list, 
but even this abbreviated litany highlights the dynamic, pluralist, and 
complex notion of marriage. Feminist economics urges contract law to 
take social context into account.162 Furthermore, even though Borelli is a 
1993 case, societal and gender-social context remains as relevant today 
as it was over twenty-five years ago.163
G. Furthering Distributive Justice
Not enforcing a promise has distributive implications. As the dis-
sent pointed out, the husband and wife in Borelli made an agreement.164
The wife performed her part of the agreement while husband did not 
perform his. The majority failed to correct this imbalance. This left the 
husband with the care from which he benefitted as a result of the 
agreement, even as he did not deliver the property promised to the wife. 
Promissory estoppel would enable the court to intervene and restore the 
equilibrium. Enforcing the promise using promissory estoppel would 
advance distributive justice.165 It would enable weaker parties to enforce 
promises made to them. It would prevent stronger parties from denying 
their promise after benefitting from it. As caring is considered feminine 
in our society and is mostly done by women,166 enforcing the husband’s 
promise in a case like this one would promote equality between women 
and men. In other words, the line between enforceable and unenforcea-
ble promises is gendered and not neutral. Promissory estoppel expands 
the borders of contract law, making the law itself more inclusive.
It might seem that applying contract law to family agreements is 
harmful to women. According to this view, regulating family through 
162. See supra Part II.E.
163. An example of changes in the marriage institution is its recent inclusion of same-sex
marriage. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644 (2015).
164. Borelli, 16 Cal. Rptr., at 20.
165. Gan, supra note 27.
166. Folbre, supra note 87.
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cold, formal, rigid economic rules of contract law might disadvantage 
women, and thus it is better to leave the family outside the realm of 
contract law. The family should remain a place where love—rather than 
contracts—rules. While this is a valid concern, it should be noted that 
the justice element of promissory estoppel makes contract law less cold 
and rigid, and thus explicitly protects weaker parties, such as women, 
from misuse of contract law. The justice element may be used to apply 
public policy considerations that will guarantee contract law will not be 
used to harm women. Moreover, this case demonstrates the harm of ex-
cluding intra-family promises from contract law. It highlights the dis-
tributive implications of regarding the family in exclusively non-
contractual terms. As family law scholar Jill Hasday observes, the law 
regulates economic exchange between intimates:
The relevant legal question is not, and has never been, 
whether intimates will exchange economic assets; it is when 
they will do so, how, why, in what forms, and to what ends. 
Economic exchange is not foreign to intimate relations, ei-
ther as a matter of first principles or as a positive matter of le-
gal regulation.167
Furthermore, the failure to intervene in family matters is not an act of 
neutrality, but rather is one that actively maintains the status quo. Non-
intervention and non-redistribution mean that family is left outside the 
law, to be governed by the privileged party, usually men. As Borelli
demonstrates, the decision not to enforce the husband’s promise means 
that the husband gets to break his promise and still get the care he was 
promised. The privileged and richer party reaps the contract’s benefits, 
while the underprivileged, poorer party gets nothing in exchange for her 
care labor. More generally, contract law shaped by the insights of femi-
nist economics will seek to benefit, rather than harm, both women and 
men.
According to the dissent in Borelli, the promise was enforceable 
under the doctrine of consideration.168 However, this does not mean 
there is no need for promissory estoppel in such cases nor does it render 
promissory estoppel insignificant. Promissory estoppel is a different 
route of enforcement; unlike consideration, it is based on reliance and 
justice. The fact that in some cases a promise could be enforced based 
167. Jill Elaine Hasday, Intimacy and Economic Exchange, 119 HARV. L. REV. 491, 493
(2005).
168. Borelli, 16 Cal. Rptr. at 25.
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on either doctrine does not mean promissory estoppel is redundant; 
there are many other cases in which no consideration is present and 
promissory estoppel becomes the only way to enforce a promise.169 In 
the same vein, having a broad notion of consideration means that many 
promissory estoppel cases will be included, but that some will still be ex-
cluded. Thus, in some cases, enforceability of promises will still depend 
on promissory estoppel only. Furthermore, applying promissory estop-
pel shuns the binary thinking (for example, the market-family dichoto-
my) of the doctrine of consideration and thus avoids the risk of com-
modifying care work. Promissory estoppel provides a complex and nu-
nuanced approach to contract formation rather than a hierarchal one. 
Though the end result is the same, enforcing the promise because care 
work qualifies as consideration is different than enforcing the promise 
because of the promisee’s reliance.
It might seem that Borelli raises family law issues rather than con-
tract law issues. In other words, this legal conflict should be resolved by 
applying laws of inheritance and succession instead of contract law. 
However, this legal dispute is about a breach of promise.170 The parties 
to this legal suit are a promisor and a promisee, not the wife and the 
daughter. The wife’s argument is that her late husband’s promise should 
be honored, and that she, not the daughter, is the rightful owner and 
that the deceased’s promise should overrule the will. Framing this case 
as an inheritance case takes the promise, which is the basis of the case, 
out of the picture.
The above feminist economic analysis criticizes the court’s decision 
in Borelli and calls for the enforcement of the husband’s promise in this 
case. Denying that a contract was made in this case results in distribu-
tive injustice. The majority opinion maintains a strong divide between 
the market and the family, and between rational wealth maximization 
and altruistic care work. Not enforcing the promise in Borelli disregards 
intra-familial promises and care work.
Applying promissory estoppel would respect such promises. It 
would expand contract law to these promises, though they are outside 
the scope of the market. It will not only advance distributive justice and 
equity but will also refute traditional gender roles in marriage. Including 
intra-family promises in contract law will broaden formation of contract 
and refute binary thinking and the market-home hierarchy. The next 
169. For example, gratuitous promises are enforced using promissory estoppel. See infra
notes 182-84.
170. Borelli, 16 Cal. Rptr. at 17.
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subpart will go beyond the Borelli example to discuss a general feminist 
economic analysis of promissory estoppel.
H. Promissory Estoppel from a Feminist Economics Perspective
The contribution of feminist economics to the doctrine of promis-
sory estoppel is apparent in other cases. Recall the Ricketts case, whose 
facts were given in the introduction.171 Like Borelli, this case shows the 
importance of broadening contract law beyond the market, and enforc-
ing promises in spite of lack of consideration. Both of these cases in-
clude agreements between family members in contract law.172 The bar-
gain theory leaves such promises outside of the world of contract; 
however, promissory estoppel enables family members to manage their 
relations using contracts. Furthermore, these cases expand contract law 
beyond efficiency considerations and utility maximization. Parties are 
not only players in the market, but they are also family members. Mar-
ket transactions are important, but so are gifts and care work; commer-
cial relations are important, but so are family relations; economic con-
siderations and motivations are important, but so are love and caring.
In Ricketts (like in Borelli) family members treated each other with 
love and care. Their contracts reflect caring and devotion to one anoth-
er. At the same time, Ricketts (like Borelli) reflects that different family 
members might have different interests. The executor, who represented 
the deceased’s interests, maintained that the promise should not be en-
forced; the granddaughter, who quit her job in reliance on her grandfa-
ther’s promise, had the opposite interest.173 Though relations between 
family members are much closer than market relations, family members 
too have differences of opinions. Contract law might be a tool to man-
age these differences by reaching compromises. Finally, Ricketts demon-
strates the importance of social background. The grandfather’s promise 
was based on his statement that none of his grandchildren work.174
Thus, his promise reflects his class, and his perception of work and life-
style. The granddaughter immediately quit her job175 and retained the 
lifestyle she could now afford thanks to her grandfather. This social con-
text is important in order to understand the contract, the grandfather’s 
promise, and the granddaughter’s reaction to his promise.
171. Ricketts v. Scothorn, 77 N.W. 365 (Neb. 1898).
172. See also, e.g., Harvey v. Dow, 962 A.2d 322 (Me. 2008).
173. Ricketts, 77 N.W. at 366.
174. Ricketts, 77 N.W. at 366.
175. Ricketts, 77 N.W. at 366.
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As these examples show, promissory estoppel is an important doc-
trine. Promissory estoppel goes beyond commercial agreements to also 
include promises made in the family setting. Promissory estoppel opens 
the possibility of enforcing promises between family members and not 
only between two parties conducting business together. It is sometimes 
difficult to meet the requirements of the doctrine of consideration. 
Promissory estoppel provides a route to enforce such promises in the 
non-market setting. This broadens the boundaries of contract law and 
relaxes the market-home binary. It treats family agreements as an inte-
gral part of contract law.
Promissory estoppel cases in the family context show that the 
household is not a singular unit, but rather that different household 
members may have different interests, perspectives, and preferences. 
These different views might lead to a legal conflict between family 
members. If the family is not a singular unit, it makes sense to talk 
about contracts between family members. Contract is the way in which 
family members might choose to manage their conflicts and disagree-
ments. Contracts may be used to enforce compromises between family 
members. Promissory estoppel, then, is the main formation rule for con-
tracts in the family setting.
Promissory estoppel cases cover a variety of contractual relations, 
and not only intra-family relations. Some of these cases deal with prom-
ises made during market activities176 such as employment,177 construc-
tion deals,178 insurance,179 franchise,180 and loans.181 However, other cases 
176. Annabelle P. Harris, The Doctrine of Promissory Estoppel in an Arm’s Length Commer-
cial Transaction in Tennessee: A Primer, 49 U. MEM. L. REV. 813, 823 (2019); Randy
E. Barnett & Mary E. Becker, Beyond Reliance: Promissory Estoppel, Contract Formali-
ties, and Misrepresentations, 15 HOFSTRA L. REV. 443, 449-50 (1987); Sidney W.
DeLong, The New Requirement of Enforcement Reliance in Commercial Promissory Es-
toppel: Section 90 as Catch-22, 1997 WIS. L. REV. 943, 946 (1997); Kevin M. Teeven,
The Advent of Recovery on Market Transactions in the Absence of a Bargain, 39 AM.
BUS. L.J. 289, 333 (2002).
177. See generally Robert A. Hillman, The Unfulfilled Promise of Promissory Estoppel in the
Employment Setting, 31 RUTGERS L.J. 1 (1999); Cortlan H. Maddux, Comment,
EMPLOYERS BEWARE! The Emerging Use of Promissory Estoppel as an Exception to
Employment at Will, 49 BAYLOR L. REV. 197 (1997); Joanna C. Kloet, Comment, Us-
ing Promissory Estoppel to Preserve Traditional Contract Principles and Protect Employee
Rights, 2005 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1235 (2005); Robert A. Hillman, Drafting Chapter 2
of the ALI’s Employment Law Restatement in the Shadow of Contract Law: An Assess-
ment of the Challenges and Results, 100 CORNELL L. REV. 1341 (2015).
178. See generally Alfred S. Konefsky, Freedom and Interdependence in Twentieth-Century
Contract Law: Traynor and Hand and Promissory Estoppel, 65 U. CIN. L. REV. 1169,
1205 (1997); Kai-Niklas A. Schneider, Maryland’s Application of Promissory Estoppel
in Construction Industry Bidding Disputes: Eliminating Further Confusion, 30 U. BALT.
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deal with charity,182 donations,183 and gifts.184 The analysis of feminist 
economics is not limited to intra-family settings and is relevant to these 
promissory estoppel cases as well.
Take, for example, King v. Trustees of Boston University.185 Dr. Mar-
tin Luther King Jr., an alumnus of Boston University, promised in a 
L. REV. 171 (2000); Janine McPeters Murphy, Note, Promissory Estoppel: Subcontrac-
tors’ Liability in Construction Bidding Cases, 63 N.C. L. REV. 387 (1985); Dorothy
Hemmer Bishop, Comment, The Subcontractor’s Bid: An Option Contract Arising
Through Promissory Estoppel, 34 EMORY L.J. 421 (1985).
179. See, e.g., Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Clark, 456 F.2d 932 (5th Cir. 1972); Marker
v. Preferred Life Ins. Co., 506 P.2d 1163 (Kan. 1973); Green v. Helmcamp Ins.
Agency, 499 S.W.2d 730 (Tex. App. 1973).
180. See, e.g., R.G. Grp., Inc. v. Horn & Hardart Co., 751 F.2d 69 (2d Cir. 1984);
Chrysler Corp. v. Quimby, 144 A.2d 123 (Del. 1958); Klinke v. Famous Recipe
Fried Chicken, Inc., 616 P.2d 644 (Wash. 1980). See generally Gregory M. Duhl,
Red Owl’s Legacy, 87 MARQ. L. REV. 297 (2003); Robert A. Hillman, Contract: Prec-
edent in Contract Cases and the Importance(?) of the Whole Story, 87 TEMP. L. REV.
759, 761-63 (2015); Robert E. Scott, Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores and the Myth of
Precontractual Reliance, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 71 (2007); William C. Whitford & Stewart
Macaulay, Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores: The Rest of the Story, 61 HASTINGS L.J. 801
(2010).
181. Amy B. Parker, Mending Broken Promises: Allowing Homeowners to Pursue Claims of
Promissory Estoppel Against Lenders When Denied Loan Modifications, 47 NEW ENG. L.
REV. 985 (2013).
182. See, e.g., Danby v. Osteopathic Hosp. Ass’n, 104 A.2d 903 (Del. 1954); Maryland
Nat’l Bank v. United Jewish Appeal Fed’n, 407 A.2d 1130 (Md. 1979); Congrega-
tion Kadimah Toras-Moshe v. DeLeo, 540 N.E.2d691 (Mass. 1989); Estate of Tim-
ko v. Oral Roberts Evangelistic Ass’n, 215 N.W.2d 750 (Mich. Ct. App. 1974).
183. See, e.g., Estate of Bucci v. Sandoval, 488 P.2d 216 (Colo. App. 1971); Greiner v.
Greiner, 293 P. 759 (Kan. 1930); see also, Sabine Tsuruda, Contract, Power, and the
Value of Donative Promises, 69 S.C. L. REV. 479, 490-99 (2017); Warren A. Seavey,
Reliance upon Gratuitous Promises or Other Conduct, 64 HARV. L. REV. 913 (1951);
Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Donative Promises, 47 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 23-31 (1979); Wil-
liam A. Drennan, Charitable Pledges: Contracts of Confusion, 120 PENN ST. L. REV.
477 (2015).
184. See, e.g., Benjamin F. Boyer, Promissory Estoppel: Principle from Precedents: I, 50
MICH. L. REV. 639, 640 (1952); Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The World of Contract and
the World of Gift, 85 CALIF. L. REV. 821, 855 (1997); Andrew Kull, Reconsidering
Gratuitous Promises, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 39, 39 (1992); Richard A. Posner, Gratuitous
Promises in Economics and Law, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 411, 411 (1977); Kevin M. Teeven,
A Legal History of Binding Gratuitous Promises at Common Law: Justifiable Reliance
and Moral Obligation, 43 DUQ. L. REV. 11, 11 (2004); Alex M. Johnson Jr., Irrevoca-
ble Gift Promises and Promises Inducing Reliance: A Mandate for the Return of the Seal
in Contract Law, 98 NEB. L. REV. 926 (2019); Stéphane Sérafin, Gifts and Contracts:
A Comparison with Quebec Civil Law, UBC L. Rev. (forthcoming)
(https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3600192).
185. King v. Trs. of Bos. Univ., 647 N.E.2d 1196 (Mass. 1995).
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note to transfer title to his papers to Boston University.186 His wife, the 
administrator of his estate, challenged the University’s claim.187 The 
court nevertheless ruled that “Dr. King made a promise to give absolute 
title to his papers to BU in a letter signed by him . . . and that the 
promise to give the papers was enforceable as a charitable pledge sup-
ported by consideration or reliance.”188 Though the court did not adopt 
the standard of Section 90 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, it 
did rule based on the elements of promise and reasonable reliance.189
The feminist economic analysis in this Article supports the en-
forcement of the note in this case. Like in the former cases, doing so ex-
pands contract law beyond the market. It enforces promises in non-
commercial contexts: donations, charities, and gifts, in addition to fami-
lies. Furthermore, it demonstrates that people act not just as rational 
utility maximizers. Here, the gift to the University was not based on 
profits or enhancing benefits to King, but rather on a wish that the pa-
pers would be used for academic research.190
This case also demonstrates the importance of social context. The 
promise to the University was based on the relations of an alumnus to 
his university. The University wanted its library to hold the papers of its 
famous alumnus and King wanted his writings to be archived and to be 
the subject of historical and other academic studies.191 Like family rela-
tions, these relations reflect a richer world of relationships not limited to 
commercial bargains. Race is also part of the social context. King was 
approached by Morehouse College, his undergraduate alma mater.192 He 
was concerned that he would be criticized for preferring Boston Univer-
sity to a Black institution in the South.193 Racial considerations played a
part in his decision whether to give his papers to Boston University or to 
Morehouse College.
Lastly, this case demonstrates that family is not a singular unit but 
rather consists of individuals with different perspectives, interests, and 
preferences. Dr. King and his wife did not see the gift to Boston Univer-
sity the same way: While he wrote a note stating his wishes to donate his 
papers to the University, after his death, his wife did not wish to deliver 
186. King, 647 N.E.2d at 1198-99.
187. King, 647 N.E.2d at 1198.
188. King, 647 N.E.2d at 1199.
189. King, 647 N.E.2d at 1200-03.
190. King, 647 N.E.2d at 1199.
191. King, 647 N.E.2d at 1199.
192. King, 647 N.E.2d at 1198.
193. King, 647 N.E.2d at 1198.
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the papers to the University. Enforcing194 the non-bargained-for promise 
in this case enriches contract law by broadening it and including within 
its scope promises in contexts of donations and gifts. The donor-donee 
relations are significant and it is thus important that contract law applies 
to these relations in cases where the promisor withdraws his or her 
promise.
Feminist economics is relevant even to commercial promissory es-
toppel cases. Take, for example, Quake Construction, Inc. v. American 
Airlines, Inc.195 In this case, a subcontractor sued the contractor for fail-
ing to reach an agreement following a letter of intent. Mayor Harold 
Washington, the first Black mayor of Chicago, sought to open up pub-
lic projects to minority businesses. The subcontractor was such a minor-
ity owned business.196 Following a bid for the expansion of the O’Hare 
Airport the subcontractor was told it has been awarded the contract for 
the project. Though a letter of intent was sent no contract was signed. 
After the subcontractor participated in a preconstruction meeting for 
the project it was told that it would not take part in the project. The 
subcontractor sued for breach of contract. In this promissory estoppel 
case one needs to look at the political and racial context of the negotia-
tions for construction work at the O’Hare Airport.197 This important 
background includes the political agenda of promoting minority busi-
nesses in Chicago. As in the previous cases, the promise and the reliance 
on the promise in this case are rooted in social context.
The same applies also to promissory estoppel in the employment 
context. Take, for example, the famous Feinberg v. Pfeiffer Co.198 In that 
case, the employer made a promise to an employee to pay her a retire-
ment pension for life.199 She retired, relying on this promise.200 The 
court awarded her promised pension based on promissory estoppel.201
Like the aforementioned cases, the relations between the parties provide 
important background to the case. In particular, gender norms in the 
job market provide important social context. Gender influences wom-
194. King, 647 N.E.2d at 1203.
195. Quake Constr., Inc. v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 565 N.E.2d 990 (Ill. 1990).
196. Quake Constr., 565 N.E.2d at 990; see Judith L. Maute, Race Politics, O’Hare Airport
Expansion, and Promissory Estoppel: The More Things Change, the More They Stay the
Same, 69 HASTINGS L.J. 119 (2017).
197. See Maute, supra note 196, at 122-29 (putting Quake Constr. in a political and histor-
ical context).
198. Feinberg v. Pfeiffer Co., 322 S.W.2d 163 (Mo. Ct. App. 1959).
199. Feinberg, 322 S.W.2d at 165-65.
200. Feinberg, 322 S.W.2d at 166.
201. Feinberg, 322 S.W.2d at 168-69.
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en’s decisions to work (rather than stay at home), what kind of work 
they do (as the job market is segregated), their employment conditions 
and terms (as employment discrimination still prevails), their retire-
ment, and so on.202
This sample of promissory estoppel cases highlights the diversity of 
relations between parties. Parties interrelate with each other in different 
settings and they are motivated by factors other than utility maximiza-
tion. For example, cases involving charity and donations demonstrate 
that people wish to donate to good causes and to benefit people they 
care about.203 People are not only selfish and rational but also act for al-
truistic and caring reasons.204 Promissory estoppel paves the way to in-
clude these motivations and promises within the scope of contract law. 
Enforcing such promises using contract law awards them the respect and 
value they deserve.
Broadening contract law to include non-bargained-for promises 
and non-commercial promises does not mean all promises will be en-
forced under promissory estoppel. Some promises will not satisfy Sec-
tion 90’s elements and thus will not be enforced.205 Other promises will 
not be enforceable because the parties did not wish to be legally bound. 
Even a significant doctrine of promissory estoppel still leaves some 
promises outside of the contract world. In addition, claiming promisso-
ry estoppel is an important doctrine does not mean it is flawless. It is 
both an important doctrine and one that might be challenged.
Promissory estoppel’s justice element opens contract law to social 
values and public policy considerations, such as balancing power dy-
namics and promoting distributive justice. This derives from the view
that parties and society are interrelated because every contract is formed 
in a specific society. Society influences the contract and the contract is 
influenced by society. Justice and reliance are open ended concepts and 
202. For example, the decision states that “[i]t is a matter of common knowledge that it is
virtually impossible for a woman of that age to find satisfactory employment, much
less a position comparable to that which plaintiff enjoyed at the time of her retire-
ment.” Feinberg, 322 S.W.2d at 169.
203. See supra notes 182-84.
204. For including emotions in contract law specifically and in law generally, see Hila Ke-
ren, Valuing Emotions, 53 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 829 (2018); Hila Keren, Guilt-Free
Markets? Unconscionability, Conscience, and Emotions, 2016 BYU L. REV. 427 (2016);
Kathryn Abrams & Hila Keren, Who’s Afraid of Law and the Emotions?, 94 MINN. L.
REV. 1997 (2010); Kathryn Abrams & Hila Keren, Law in the Cultivation of Hope,
95 CALIF. L. REV. 319 (2007); Kathy Abrams & Hila Keren, Legal Hopes: Enhancing
Resilience Through the External Cultivation of Positive Emotions, 64 N. IR. LEGAL Q.
111 (2013).
205. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
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applying them should include a contextual analysis of both the relation-
ship between the parties and the social circumstances surrounding the 
contract. 
From a feminist economic standpoint, the gender dynamics be-
tween parties are crucial to understanding agreements. Specifically, the 
social context of patriarchy, discrimination, and inequality is important 
when women enter into contracts. Promissory estoppel incorporates this 
context to the legal analysis of contracts by considering both intra-party
and inter-party relationships. Such context enhances contract law by 
looking beyond the traditional economic market and thereby making 
contract formation more flexible. Promissory estoppel thus expands 
contract law’s boundaries and makes them more inclusive. As described 
above, the value of promissory estoppel therefore rests in its ability to
supplement to the doctrine of consideration.
The above also shows the difference between mainstream economic
analysis and feminist economic analysis. Mainstream economics focuses 
on market transactions: It is concerned with efficiency, assumes parties 
are rational utility maximizers, and supports the status quo.206 On the 
other hand, feminist economics focuses on family and other social set-
tings: It looks at the social context (and primarily the gendered social 
context) of the contract, assumes parties are motivated by love and care 
as well as by personal gains, and seeks to promote gender equality and 
redistribution. Feminist economics not only broadens economic analysis 
(i.e., by providing a broader definition of well-being or utility) but also
constitutes a profound transformation of economic analysis itself. Femi-
nist analysis enriches economics by challenging its male bias and open-
ing economics to include women’s perspectives.
Other scholars have stressed the importance of promissory estoppel 
for a variety of reasons, and on the basis of a number of theories.207 This 
Article adds to this scholarship a fresh analysis from a feminist economic 
perspective. In other words, the above feminist economic analysis joins 
together with other theories and can be used to provide additional sup-
port to and evidence for the importance of promissory estoppel. Femi-
nist economics has general applications to contract law beyond the doc-
trine of promissory estoppel,208 as elaborated in the next part.
206. See supra Part I.C.
207. See supra notes 43-59 and accompanying text.
208. See Lua Kamál Yuille, Toward a Heterodox Property Law and Economics, 2 TEX. A&M
L. REV. 489, 498 (2015) (containing a feminist economic analysis of property law);
Ann Laquer Estin, Can Families Be Efficient? A Feminist Appraisal, 4 MICH. J.
GENDER & L. 1 (1996) (containing a feminist economic analysis of family law).
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IV. Feminist Economics Analysis of Contract Law
Feminist economics is a heterodox economic theory. Feminist eco-
nomics means more than just “add feminism and stir.”209 Rather, it fun-
damentally challenges the gendered foundations of mainstream econom-
ics.210 The combination of both economic theory and feminist theory 
results in an integrated theory that is more powerful than the sum of its 
parts. Feminist economics analysis enriches contract law, as the follow-
ing demonstrates. The main features of feminist economics are relevant 
to contract law more generally and are not limited to the doctrine of 
promissory estoppel.
A. Other Contract Law Doctrines
The doctrine of promissory estoppel was provided in this Article as 
one example, but the above insights are relevant to other doctrines as 
well. For instance, interpretation of contract should take into account 
the interconnectedness between the parties and society. This social con-
text is important for understanding the contract’s meaning.211 In other 
words, feminist economics joins other scholarship in supporting contex-
tual interpretation. Take for example the question of what the term 
“sandwich” means in a given contract. Does it include a burrito? An an-
swer to this question is not a matter of the dictionary definition of a 
sandwich, but rather must stem from an engagement with cultural, eth-
nic, racial, and class aspects.212
Another doctrine that is contextual is unconscionability. The fa-
mous case of Walker-Thomas213 illustrates the importance of gender, 
class, and race when analyzing predatory business practices and the rela-
tionship between the parties and the contract.214 In Walker-Thomas the 
209. See generally SANDRA HARDING, Just Add Women and Stir?, in MISSING LINKS:
GENDER EQUITY IN SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY FOR DEVELOPMENT 296 (1995)
(adding women without substantive change is problematic).
210. Nelson, supra note 4.
211. See, e.g., CATHERINE MITCHELL, INTERPRETATION OF CONTRACTS 54 (2d ed. 2019)
(discussing contextual interpretation).
212. Marjorie Florestal, Is a Burrito a Sandwich? Exploring Race, Class, and Culture in Con-
tracts, 14 MICH. J. RACE & L. 1, 57-59 (2008).
213. Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
214. Anthony R. Chase, Race, Culture, and Contract Law: From the Cottonfield to the
Courtroom, 28 CONN. L. REV. 1, 63 (1995); Amy H. Kastely, Out of the Whiteness:
On Raced Codes and White Race Consciousness in Some Tort, Criminal, and Contract
Law, 63 U. CIN. L. REV. 269, 305-10 (1994); Blake D. Morant, Law, Literature, and
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parties were a retail furniture store and a poor Black woman.215 Accord-
ing to its installment contract, Walker-Thomas retained title in all of 
her furniture purchases until the total of all the monthly payments made 
equaled the stated value of an item. In the event of a default in the pay-
ment of any monthly installment, Walker-Thomas could repossess the 
item. The imbalance of power between the parties and the misuse of it 
by Walker-Thomas is an important background to the court’s uncon-
scionability analysis. This case demonstrates the predatory practices 
faced by poor Black women. Feminist economics, then, exposes the 
gendered economic aspects of the unconscionability doctrine.
Damages for breach of contract are also gendered. For example, 
damages for a deformed nose as a result of plastic surgery216 were award-
ed within a context of gendered notions of beauty and looks. In Sullivan 
v. O’Connor, the plaintiff, a professional entertainer, underwent an op-
eration to shorten her nose. Afterwards, she sued, claiming the operation 
had worsened her appearance.217 In its decision, the court described her 
nose before and after the operation. It awarded her damages for pain 
and suffering, mental distress, and worsening her conditions, even 
though she did not show she suffered loss of employment. Thus the 
damages award was intended to reflect the loss of her looks as a woman, 
not the effect on her as a professional.
Unconscionability and good faith doctrines integrate into contract 
law values other than efficiency. These doctrines highlight parties’ coop-
eration, interdependence, trust, and caring. They portray parties as more 
than rational utility maximizers. Instead of a simplistic, narrow account 
of the parties, these doctrines allow a richer, more complex and fuller 
view of the parties. Also, these doctrines integrate into contract law so-
cial values and public policy.218 For example, these doctrines can battle 
discrimination practices and promote equality. If parties are part of soci-
Contract: An Essay in Realism, 4 MICH. J. RACE & L. 1, 5-6 (1989); Blake D. Morant,
The Teachings of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. and Contract Theory: An Intriguing
Comparison, 50 ALA. L. REV. 63, 108-09 (1998) [hereinafter Morant, The Teachings
of Dr. King]; see also Blake D. Morant, The Relevance of Race and Disparity in Discus-
sions of Contract Law, 31 NEW ENG. L. REV. 889, 925-36 (1997); Muriel Morisey
Spence, Teaching Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 3 TEMP. POL. & CIV.
RTS. L. REV. 89, 98-99 (1994).
215. Walker-Thomas, 350 F.2d at 447.
216. Sullivan v. O’Connor, 296 N.E.2d 183 (Mass. 1973).
217. Sullivan, 296 N.E.2d at 184-85.
218. Hila Keren, “We Insist! Freedom Now”: Does Contract Doctrine Have Anything Consti-
tutional to Say?, 11 MICH. J. RACE & L. 133, 179-83 (2005); Hila Keren, Law and
Economic Exploitation in an Anti-Classification Age, 42 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 313, 365-
67 (2015).
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ety and contract is a social tool, then these values are important factors 
of contract law. While mainstream law and economics explains these 
doctrines on the basis of efficiency, feminist economics enriches this ex-
planation beyond efficiency.
Social context is also important to the doctrines of duress and un-
due influence. Especially in the family context, the story behind these 
legal claims is a story of patriarchy, power dynamics between women 
and men, social norms, and gender roles. For example, threats made by 
husbands against their wives while negotiating a prenuptial agreement 
are based on social gender power structures.219 Another example is pres-
sures husbands place upon their wives to sign as a surety for the hus-
band’s business debt.220 In a related vein, the doctrine of undue influ-
ence covers pressures resulting from discrimination against LGBTQ 
individuals.221
B. Core Values and Concepts
Feminist economics provides an alternative analysis to contract law. 
It gives values such as cooperation, interdependence, relations, trust, 
care, fairness, and justice central places in contract law, and goes well 
beyond narrow concepts such as wealth maximization and efficiency. It 
gives a fresh account of basic concepts like consent,222 freedom of con-
tract,223 and autonomy.224 These concepts should be reframed to include 
219. Orit Gan, Contractual Duress and Relations of Power, 36 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 171,
209-10 (2013).
220. BELINDA FEHLBERG, SEXUALLY TRANSMITTED DEBT: SURETY EXPERIENCE AND
ENGLISH LAW (1997); Rosemary Auchmuty, Men Behaving Badly: An Analysis of Eng-
lish Undue Influence Cases, 11 SOC. & LEGAL STUD. 257, 265-66 (2002).
221. Odorizzi v. Bloomfield Sch. Dist., 54 Cal. Rptr. 533, 543 (Cal. Ct. App. 1966).
222. For contractual consent, see generally NANCY S. KIM, CONSENTABILITY: CONSENT
AND ITS LIMITS, 5-48 (2019) (discussing what it means to consent); see also Brian Bix,
Contracts, in THE ETHICS OF CONSENT: THEORY AND PRACTICE 251 (Franklin G.
Miller & Alan Wertheimer eds., 2009) (exploring many of the issues relating to con-
sent in contract law); Orit Gan, The Many Faces of Contractual Consent, 65 DRAKE L.
REV. 615, 618-26 (2017) (offering a model of consent); Chunlin Leonhard, The Un-
bearable Lightness of Consent in Contract Law, 63 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 57, 70-73
(2012) (examining consent in contract law).
223. See Hila Keren, Undermining Justice: The Two Rises of Freedom of Contract and the
Fall of Equity, 2016 CAN. J. COMP. & CONTEMP. L. 339 (2016); see also Hila Keren,
In the Land of Choice: Privatized Reality and Contractual Vulnerability, in
PRIVATIZATION, VULNERABILITY, AND SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY: A COMPARATIVE
PERSPECTIVE 60 (Martha Albertson Fineman, Ulrika Andersson & Titti Mattsson
eds., 2017).
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social norms and expectations. Parties’ choices and preferences cannot 
be analyzed without taking into account social context, such as social 
status, position, background, and circumstances. Specifically, gender 
dynamics operating under a system of patriarchy constitute an im-
portant social context. Feminist economics, then, challenges the stand-
ard concept of consent, given that people are differently situated in soci-
ety, have diverse opportunities and choices, and face unique limitations 
and constraints to their agency and autonomy. Parties’ preferences are 
not stable and fixed, but are rather the result of ever-changing social 
norms and contexts. As I argue elsewhere:
Consent is not binary, but exists along a spectrum. In be-
tween full and free consent, on one end, and no consent, on 
the other, lie hypothetical consent and implied consent, as 
well as partial, questionable, and intermediate consent . . . .
Consent is nuanced and contextual and depends on circum-
stances; it varies in different types of contracts, and is in part 
determined by the type of relationship between contracting 
parties . . . . Consent is influenced not only by the relation-
ships between the parties, but also by larger cultural and so-
cial context. Consent is socially situated: the consenting par-
ty’s position in society (gender, race, class) shapes his or her 
consent.225
Feminist insights on the variety of contractual relations, the differ-
ent preferences and interests of parties, and the importance of care pro-
vide a more complex picture of the world of contract. Thus, one needs 
to situate contracts in the social context of discrimination and inequality 
and relations of class, race, and gender. Rather than a simplistic and re-
ductive notion of consent, feminist economics provides complex and 
nuanced concepts of freedom and autonomy. As Kathryn Abrams ex-
plains, autonomy is gendered.226
224. See generally HANOCH DAGAN & MICHAEL HELLER, THE CHOICE THEORY OF
CONTRACTS 3 (2017).
225. Gan, supra note 222, at 660.
226. Kathryn Abrams, From Autonomy to Agency: Feminist Perspectives on Self-Direction, 40
WM. & MARY L. REV. 805, 813-22 (1999).
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C. Non-Binary Thinking
Feminist economics critiques binary thinking and hierarchies in 
contract law, such as those drawn between market and home. As 
demonstrated, contract law is not limited to market transactions, as 
people relate to one another in different forms and in different settings. 
People interact with one another in communities and in families, not 
only through the market. These are important relations to the parties 
themselves, as well as to the economy. Therefore, contract law should 
account for these agreements too. This not only reveals how the bound-
aries of contract law are set in a gendered way but also how contract law 
could be more inclusive. Feminist economics refutes simplistic ideas
about parties and their motivations as solely rational utility maximizers. 
It provides, instead, a more nuanced model of parties’ relations and 
preferences and of the complex interaction between the self and society, 
as well as that between the contract and the social background. Contract 
law doctrines are not only procedural but also reflect and promote val-
ues such as justice, fairness, efficiency, autonomy. In other words, con-
tract law goes beyond procedure to advance moral values. As discussed 
above, promissory estoppel not only distinguishes enforceable promises 
from unenforceable promises but also strengthens the right to contract. 
It protects weaker promisees and mitigates power imbalances between 
the parties in addition to the doctrine of formation of contract. Other 
binaries that should be relaxed are those of objective-subjective, and of 
form-substance.227 As will be further discussed in the next subpart, con-
tract law is not simply private, but has social aspects as well.
Non-binary thinking in contract law is more nuanced and reflects 
the complexity of contractual situations. Rather than black and white 
dichotomies, contract law should include shades of gray. Furthermore, 
binaries are oftentimes hierarchal in that they not only separate two op-
tions, but frequently situate one option as superior to the other. In other 
words, not only do such binaries stress the difference between private 
and public—or the market and the home—but also enable a preference 
of the former over the latter. Such binaries establish an exclusionary 
form of contract law. Rather than dichotomize between one (private) or 
the other (public), it is critical to acknowledge that the two are interre-
lated in many subtle ways.
227. For binary thinking in contract law, see generally Clare Dalton, An Essay in the De-
construction of Contract Doctrine, 94 YALE L.J. 997, 1039-65, 1066-94 (1985).
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D. Social Aspects
Feminist economics highlights the interconnectedness of contract 
and society and the interrelation between the private and the public. 
According to feminist economics, parties are influenced by society and 
their contracting is shaped by social context.228 The contract is shaped 
by social norms, by the parties’ respective social statuses, and circum-
stances. Ignoring this background will necessarily limit the contract 
analysis. In order to fully understand a contract, one needs to look at 
the social context that exists beyond the specific language of the con-
tract. Specifically, one needs to take into account gender roles, gender 
stereotypes, and power dynamics.229 As Debora Threedy shows, the Ar-
thur Murray cases are based on gendered notions of widows.230 One also 
needs to consider inequalities and discrimination on the basis of sex, 
class and sexual orientation. Doing so would result in a fuller, more 
complex analysis that goes beyond binaries. Contract law, although con-
sidered private law, has important social aspects. Feminist economics 
supports contextual contract law.231
Consent, a basic concept of contract law, is also socially construct-
ed. As I have argued elsewhere:
Consent is undoubtedly connected to the will, choices, and 
intentions of the parties, but it is also molded by public poli-
cy considerations that go beyond the parties’ interactions. As 
such, consent is dynamic, its nature changing over time as 
the result of broader social changes . . . . In this light, consent 
must be viewed not only as a decision based on full infor-
mation and reached without coercion, but also one which is 
socially and culturally situated. Similarly, consent is not only 
a matter of dynamics between contracting parties, but also a 
228. See supra Part II.E.
229. See Threedy, Dancing Around Gender, supra note 2.
230. See id. at 761 (arguing that the Arthur Murray cases portray women litigants as vul-
nerable elderly widows in need of the paternalistic defense of the law).
231. For contextual contract law, see Daniel D. Barnhizer, Context as Power: Defining the
Field of Battle for Advantage in Contractual Interactions, 45 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 607
(2010). See also Larry A. DiMatteo & Blake D. Morant, Contracts in Context and
Contracts as Context, 45 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 549, 550-51 (2010); Morant, The
Teachings of Dr. King, supra note 214, at 70; Larry A. DiMatteo, Contract Stories: Im-
portance of the Contextual Approach to Law, 88 WASH. L. REV. 1287 (2013). For legal
context generally, see Martha Minow & Elizabeth V. Spelman, In Context, 63 S. CAL.
L. REV. 1597 (1990).
46 michigan  jo urn al  o f  g ender & la w [Vol. 28:1
product of external societal circumstances, pressures, con-
straints, morals, norms, conventions, and understandings 
that go beyond the parties’ own relationships . . . . Contract 
law contains an inherent element of public considerations, 
which clearly renders consent as a social construct with pub-
lic dimensions greater than the scope of a personal decision 
based on the contracting parties’ will and choices. Consent is 
not only an individualistic process, formed in a vacuum be-
tween the contracting parties’ will, autonomy, interests, and 
preferences. Consent is necessarily formed under social cir-
cumstances.232
Consent is gendered and formed within the context of patriarchy.
E. Contracts Between Family Members
If the household is treated as a singular unit, it makes no sense to 
talk about contracts between family members. However, feminist eco-
nomics views the household as a group of individuals with different in-
terests and preferences that might sometimes conflict. Therefore, con-
tract law should include intra-family contracts. This opens contract law 
to more nuanced relations, and more agreements. It stretches contract 
law beyond the market and beyond pure commercial or economic 
agreements. More people will benefit from contract law; more relations 
will be covered by contract law.233 Conflicts in the family might be re-
solved using contracts. And at the same time, incorporating family val-
ues can influence contract law. Both institutions might benefit from the 
existence of intra-family contracts. Contract law should not be limited 
to commercial agreements. As Hanoch Dagan explains, “spousal con-
tracts operate, of course, in a different contract sphere than commercial 
ones, but they perform a similar empowering service, and are thus no 
less (or more) central to the idea of contract in law.”234 Furthermore, 
232. Gan, supra note 222, at 652.
233. See Neil G. Williams, What to Do When There’s No “I Do”: A Model for Answering
Damages Under Promissory Estoppel, 70 WASH. L. REV. 1019, 1043 (1995) (arguing
that promissory estoppel should be used to award damages for breach of promise to
marry); see generally Alex M. Johnson, Jr., The Legality of Contracts Governing the Dis-
position of Embryos: Unenforceable Intra-Family Agreements, 43 SW. L. REV. 191
(2013).
234. Hanoch Dagan, Intimate Contracts and Choice Theory, 7 EUROPEAN CONT. L. &
THEORY 1 (forthcoming 2021).
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contract law will enable a plurality of family arrangements.235 Each fami-
ly will be able to use contract law in order to shape the family setting as 
they see fit. Rather than one standard for all families, each family will 
choose the relational model that best suits them.
There are arguments against applying contract law in the family 
setting. Family relations are unique, it could be argued, and thus cannot 
be thought of in contractual terms. Others could claim that family is 
about relations of love and not about economic relations. Furthermore, 
it might be posited that the involvement of economic values could harm 
family members. Commodification concerns and concerns regarding the 
reduction of intra-family relations to an economic exchange are not only 
frequently inaccurate, but may, in fact, result in injustice. This is not to 
say such critique is not valuable, nor that commodification isn’t a genu-
ine concern. However, it is clear that contract law can be stretched to 
include intra-family contracts, while still safeguarding against aliena-
tion.236 Feminist economics will make contract law more relational and 
strengthen the trust, cooperation, and interdependence between the par-
ties. Contract law applied to intra-family agreement is not rigid and 
formalistic, entailing a focus on efficiency only, but rather is a version of 
contract law that connects parties to each other.237
Take, for example, the hypothetical issue of baby selling. Landes 
and Posner proposed a market for babies based on a mainstream eco-
235. See generally Erez Aloni, The Puzzle of Family Law Pluralism, 39 HARV. J.L. &
GENDER 317 (2016).
236. For contract law’s alienation, see generally Robert Batey, Alienation by Contract in
Paris Trout, 35 S. TEX. L. REV. 289 (1994).
237. There is rich literature addressing contracts between family members. See MARTHA
M. ERTMAN, LOVE’S PROMISES: HOW FORMAL AND INFORMAL CONTRACTS SHAPE
ALL KINDS OF FAMILIES (2015); YEHEZKEL MARGALIT, THE JEWISH FAMILY:
BETWEEN FAMILY LAW AND CONTRACT LAW (2018); YEHEZKEL MARGALIT,
DETERMINING LEGAL PARENTAGE: BETWEEN FAMILY LAW AND CONTRACT LAW 10
(2019); Mary Anne Case, Enforcing Bargains in an Ongoing Marriage, 35 WASH. U.
J.L. & POL’Y 225, 225-27 (2011); Martha M. Ertman, Commercializing Marriage: A
Proposal for Valuing Women’s Work Through Premarital Security Agreements, 77 TEX.
L. REV. 17, 37-54 (1998); Virginia Held, Non-Contractual Society: A Feminist View,
13 CAN. J. PHIL. 111, 136-137 (1987); Hila Keren, Can Separate Be Equal: Intimate
Economic Exchange and the Cost of Being Special, 119 HARV. L. REV. F. 19, 25-26
(2005); Robert A. Pollak, Commentary, Comment on Mary Anne Case’s Enforcing
Bargains in an Ongoing Marriage, 35 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 261, 261-262 (2011);
Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert E. Scott, Marriage as Relational Contract, 84 VA. L. REV.
1225, 1231 (1998); Marjorie Maguire Shultz, The Gendered Curriculum: Of Contracts
and Careers, 77 IOWA L. REV. 55, 58-60 (1991).
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nomic analysis.238 Their analysis uses supply and demand, and the costs 
and benefits considerations of such market.239 However, feminist eco-
nomics would take into account the values of caring for children, their 
humanity, commodification concerns, the parents-children relations and 
the social harms to society, as well as the racial and class aspects of such 
a market regime.240
More broadly, Richard Posner, for example, assumes preferences, 
rational choice, and a free market in his economic analysis of sexuali-
ty.241 Feminist economics, on the other hand, places sexuality within a 
larger social context, such as that of power dynamics between men and 
women.242 As these examples demonstrate, feminist economics is not a 
rigid application of economic principles, but rather is an economics 
aware of social concerns, including commodification and other moral 
public policy and fairness concerns. Feminist economics goes beyond 
rationality and efficiency and is sensitive to feminist and other social 
considerations. Thus, applying feminist economics analysis to the family 
does not raise genuine concerns of alienation and commodification as 
would the application of mainstream economics to the same sphere.
As shown by Borelli, decisions regarding what promises to enforce 
are gendered. In other words, setting the boundaries of contract law is 
not gender neutral. The decision to leave family outside contract law’s
reach results in distributive injustice. It has devastating economic conse-
quences for women, often leaving them without the promised exchange 
or other recourse. Recall that in Borelli the husband’s promise was not 
enforced and the wife did not get the property that he promised her.243
Women’s inability to use contract law to further their economic inter-
ests hurts them financially. Women’s poverty is an important concern. 
Contracts with family members can provide women with some financial 
support. In the past, women could not own property or contract at all, 
thus leaving them dependent on their fathers or husbands.244 Further-
more, applying contract law in the family setting does not mean that 
238. Elisabeth M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Economics of the Baby Shortage, 7 J.
LEGAL STUD. 323 (1978).
239. Id. at 329.
240. For a critique of baby selling, see Margaret Jane Radin, Market Inalienability, 100
HARV. L. REV. 1849, 1925-28 (1987).
241. POSNER, supra note 91; see also BECKER, supra note 91.
242. For a feminist critique of Posner, see Robin West, Sex, Reason, and a Taste for the Ab-
surd, 81 GEO.L.J. 2413 (1993). See also Ann Laquer Estin, Love and Obligation: Fam-
ily Law and the Romance of Economics, 36 WM. & MARY L. REV. 989 (1995).
243. Borelli v. Brusseau, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d 16, 20 (1993).
244. See Chused, supra note 138, at 48-49.
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everything in the family is a matter of contract. Some things are outside 
the realm of contract law. For example, baby selling is prohibited for 
commodification reasons.245 At the same time, applying contract law in 
the family setting includes applying doctrines that protect vulnerable 
family members (usually women), such as unconscionability246 and good 
faith.247 These contract doctrines ensure that family values and family 
members are not hurt by rigid contract law, but rather that contract law 
applied in the family sphere is relational, flexible, just, fair, protectionist, 
and contextual.
All of the above makes contract law broader and more inclusive. It 
goes beyond the market and efficiency to incorporate diverse relations, 
interests, and preferences. It promotes a variety of values and includes a 
wide range of different parties. It is sensitive to commodification, aliena-
tion, inequality, and discrimination. In other words, feminist economics 
does not only enrich the literature of promissory estoppel but contract 
law scholarship in general, as well.
Feminist economics joins other theories in stressing the aforemen-
tioned insights. It is not the only theory to challenge formal liberal con-
tract law; relational theory of contract and other critical theories such as 
feminist theory and critical race theory do so as well. For example, Ian 
R. MacNeil has criticized the individualistic nature of classic contract 
law and pointed to the relational and social aspects of contract law.248
However, MacNeil failed to account for power dynamics between men 
and women. Feminist economics’ use of both economics and feminist 
insights provides a new perspective on contract law. In other words, 
feminist economics is an important theoretical tool with which to ana-
lyze contract law, even if some of its conclusions echo those of other 
theories. Furthermore, as demonstrated above, feminist economics en-
riches contract law, making it more inclusive, pluralistic, contextual, 
egalitarian, and just. Since economic analysis of contract law is im-
mensely important, it is critical to integrate feminist insights into its 
core. As economics scholar Susan Himmelweit concludes, “feminist 
245. Another example of commodification in family law is the practice of women offering
money to their husbands in exchange for a gett (Jewish decree of divorce) that the
husband would otherwise refuse to agree to. See Orit Gan, Trading the Gett: Between
Contractual Right and Inalienability, 32 BAR ILAN L. STUD. 797 (2020) (Isr.).
246. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTS. § 208 (AM. L. INST. 1981).
247. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTS. § 205 (AM. L. INST. 1981).
248. For relational theory, see, for example, IAN R. MACNEIL, THE NEW SOCIAL
CONTRACT: AN INQUIRY INTO MODERN CONTRACTUAL RELATIONS (1980); see also
THE RELATIONAL THEORY OF CONTRACT: SELECTED WORKS OF IAN MACNEIL (Da-
vid Campbell ed., 2001).
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economics is not just another school of economics—and certainly not as 
economics just for women—but is simply better economics.”
249
There-
fore, feminist economics provides a better theoretical analysis of contract 
law.
Conclusion
Economic analysis is a highly influential theoretical approach to 
contract law. At the same time, feminist analysis of contract law offers 
an important critical approach to the field. However, feminist econom-
ics has only been applied scarcely and sporadically to contract law. This 
Article seeks to bridge this gap, and to apply the key features of feminist 
economics to an analysis of the doctrine of promissory estoppel. This 
Article uses promissory estoppel as an example to demonstrate a feminist 
economic analysis of contract law. This Article enriches the diverse liter-
ature of promissory estoppel by adding to it a feminist economic per-
spective.Based on analyses put forward by feminist economics, this Ar-
ticle joins other scholarship in exploring the importance and significance 
of this doctrine. Specifically, it enriches the economic analysis of prom-
issory estoppel, and it adds to the literature concerning the relation be-
tween the doctrine of consideration and the doctrine of promissory es-
toppel, arguing that the latter is a valuable and important supplement to 
the former. This Article concludes by arguing that feminist economics is 
applicable to contract law generally.Feminist economics is a valuable 
theory—relevant not only to promissory estoppel but to other doctrines, 
core concepts, and values at the heart of contract law.
249.Himmelweit,supranote75,at73.
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